I'm continuing to read in Plantinga's "God and Other Minds" and found the chapter on the problem of evil interesting. Since this is probably the most frequently sited apologetic challenge I thought I would summarize his argument here.
The challenge: The existence of evil and the belief in an omnipotent and perfect God are contradictory beliefs. Plantinga suggests that this can be set forth in five propositions essential to traditional theism, with respect to the problem:
a) that God exists
b) that God is omnipotent
c) that God is omniscient
d) that God is wholly good
e) that evil exists
There is no formal contradiction in these five propositions. Some other proposition must be added to this to produce the contradiction. Such a proposition must be:
i) necessarily true
and/or
ii) an essential part of theism
or
iii) a logical consequence of such propositions
Finding an additional proposition that accomplishes the purpose intended has proven to be very elusive (Plantinga surveys the field of suggestions).
Now an omnipotent God is able to eliminate every case of evil and a perfectly good God would want to do so. Plantinga suggests that a proviso should be added to this: this is the case if, and only if, it does not require him to eliminate a greater good in order to do so.
This proviso throws a wrench into the atheological argument from evil. (Consider if Job's suffering produced a state of affairs which is a greater good than would have been the case if the evil had been prevented. The answer to this is at least arguable in the affirmative.)
The atheologian must now prove that unjustified evil exists. That is, "there is at least one evil state of affairs such that for every good that entails it, there is a greater good that does not."
The atheist must show that it is logically impossible that there is evil and that all of it is justified. In other words, "If there is any evil in the world, then there is unjustified evil" must be shown to be a necessarily true proposition. Very difficult to do.
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4 comments:
If my memory and senses tell me that almost everybody has two legs, can I logically conclude that almost everybody has two legs?
In other words, is there a logical contradiction between the statements
1) My memory and senses tell me that almost everybody has two legs
2) In reality, everybody except me has just the one leg.
If there is no logical contradiction between the two statements, what is the point of providing more and more and more evidence that my memory and senses do tell me that almost everybody has two legs?
I already know that it is true!
How will proving it is true ever prove a contradiction of the unipedality of Homo sapiens?
So if there is no logical problem of legs, and if it is useless producing evidence to prove true what I already concede is true, then there is no evidential problem of legs.
Plantinga's 'refutation' of the logical problem of evil (while also unsound) is the Doomsday device of Christian apologetics.
He has ruled out logical arguments to such an extent that Christians cannot even say we can draw a logical deduction that people do have two legs, from the mere fact that we can observe them to have two legs.
Plantinga's defense is no more than a fig-leaf.
Atheistic philosophers claimed that theistic beliefs were naked in the face of evil.
Plantinga has found a fig-leaf, enabling him to deny being naked.
But walking around wearing only a fig-leaf is an embarrassing position.
As Plantinga's methods can be used to defend the idea that Homo sapiens have only one leg, it is clearly absurd.
But he has yet to show that it is rational to hold such a belief.
Probably why Mackie wrote in 'The Miracle of Theism' that Plantinga had missed the point.
The Logical Problem of Evil is as strong as a claim that people have two legs.
Actually, if Plantinga just wanted a sound 'refutation' of the Logical Problem of Evil, he could simply have claimed that we might all be vats in brains.
That works as a 'refutation' doesn't it?
Hi Steven:
Thanks for visiting my blog and for taking the time to comment. What you are offering here is not an argument but an assertion. The assertion you make is that the presence of evil is a self-evident refutation of the existence of the Christian God. Plantinga addresses the rational underpinnings of this assertion and attempts to show that it is not nearly as self-evident, upon reflection, as it may appear at first glance. What you have not done is respond to the argument that Plantinga makes. This discussion of Plantinga's is part of an ongoing dialogue that he is engaged in with his peers (most importantly with those who strongly disagree with him). The discussion proceeds by argument, counterargument and analysis and nothing is served simply by repeating that there is a problem to be addressed and that the answer is self-evident.
What is a mere assertion? Is it a mere assertion to deny that Mr. Incredible exists because we see evils happening which the film tells us that Mr. Incredible would prevent?
Can we use Plantinga's methods to show that we cannot make a logical conclusion that we have two legs, from the fact that we can see that people have two legs?
Or is claiming that we do have two legs a mere assertion, along the lines of claiming that there are other minds? Mere assertions for which there is no logical proof (using Plantinga's methods of denying logical proofs)
In fact, is there any logical proof that I am not an all-good person?
Do these statements contradict each other?
1) Steven Carr has never knowingly sinned
2) Steven Carr has done things which look bad at first glance.
If there is no logical proof that I have knowingly sinned, how does God know for a fact that I have knowingly sinned?
As for Plantinga's argument, it refutes itself.
Plantinga claims God is a necessary being and exists in all logically possible worlds, but Plantinga also claims that there are only a *few* logically possible worlds in which the existence of evil and an omnibenevolent God are compatible.
Plantinga has to show that in *all* logically possible worlds, evil is compatible with the existence of a necessary, omnibenevolent God.
Plantinga also personally told me in an email that God has created beings with free will that have never chosen evil.
This means that God can prevent evil by creating beings with free will that never choose evil. Plantinga himself claims that he can and has done exactly that.
Plantinga's main argument is discussed in more detail at Alvin Plantinga and the Problem of Evil
And also at Molinism
The articles are a bit long for a comment box, so I have not copied them here.
Hi Steve:
Some comments in response to your recent post:
1. Assertions are important in debate, however once a response has been made it is not helpful to then counter with a simple restatement of the assertion. This is what I was pointing out.
2. What do you mean by Plantinga’s methods? Are you referring to the Analytical Method of doing philosophy? If not this then you need to be specific about the particular methodology he is employing.
3. By continuing to say that “we can see that people have two legs” you are simply repeating what you said earlier: that your position is so self-evident as to not warrant any debate. If this is what you are saying then there is nowhere for our discussion to go. I think you might have at least indicated what you think of Plantinga’s line of argument as presented on this post.
4. I don’t know what to do with your anti-confession. The statement “Steven Carr has never knowingly sinned” entails both your belief in the existence of sin and your claim of innocence. I know people who deny the existence of sin but I don’t know anyone else who acknowledges the existence of sin but claims that to their best understanding they have never sinned. With respect to God’s knowledge of your sin I must confess that I simply don’t understand your question since if there is a God he must surely be omniscient.
5. I can’t find the Plantinga reference to possible worlds, although I remember reading it. I flipped through “God and Other Minds but didn’t come across it. I have never seen a professional philosopher dismiss Plantinga as off-handedly as you do so I suspect you are engaging in a little straw man activity here.
6. Its not hard to tell from reading your responses here and your posts on your blog that you are not professionally trained as a philosopher, as I am not as well. This does not make your comments and opinions uninteresting by any means. However, when addressing the work of people who are highly respected in their field and who work at a much more technical level than we do it is worthwhile to be very careful both in dismissing or in accepting their positions.
7. I would certainly wish to concede to you that the problem of evil is a problem for both the atheist and the Christian alike. It is not just an intellectual or philosophical problem, it is a moral problem, and a practical problem, and it weighs on us all.
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