I'm reading Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968). In his opening chapter he writes:
"The lack of general agreement among philosophers, whether in different historical periods or at a given time, has been the cause of much criticism. Many of the differences in philosophical views may be attributed to the diversity of motives which lead thinkers to more ultimate speculation or inquiry."
You could replace the word philosophers with almost any branch of study and the statement would make as much sense. People often criticize various disciplines for their abundance of disunity and disagreement and point to this as evidence of the weakness of the discipline. On the contrary it is out of the multitude of views that critical debate arises and progress is made. I believe that this was Paul Feyerabend's point in recognizing and encouraging anarchism in the scientific disciplines. Science (and other disciplines) are weakened when there is too much pressure for conformity to particular theories and viewpoints. Only in a perfect world would perfect conformity be an asset. The key to making the most of our disagreements is to enter into and continue the dialogue.
Showing posts with label Debate. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Debate. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 13, 2006
Thursday, January 12, 2006
"doctrines seen as facts"
I'm continuing to explore the reasons why, in certain debates, people holding different positions cannot give up the view that their opponent can only be dishonest, ignorant, or irrational. Certainly there are dishonest, ignorant, and irrational people out there but there is something more to this dynamic than this assessment suggests. Here are some ideas I came across in reading Anthony Thiselton's Two Horizons. Thiselton is discussing some ideas by G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty):
"Cultural presuppositions, Hulme declares, become so much a part of the mind of the people of the given culture 'and lie so far back, that they are never really conscious of them. They do not see them, but other things through them.' They constitute 'doctrines seen as facts.' In due course we shall compare the idea of cultural presuppositions with some of Wittgenstein's observations in his last writing On Certainty, on what G.E. Moore had regarded as certainties of 'common sense.' They are certainties, Wittgenstein argues, in the sense that they are like hinges on which all our every day presuppositions turn. They perform a logical role not unlike that of the theological assertion 'it is written.' Such a proposition, Wittgenstein explains, 'gives our way of looking at things...their form...'" (P.74)
"They articulate 'the scaffolding of our thoughts'." (P 392)
"Within certain communities they have become virtually unquestioned or even unquestionable axioms; they function 'as a foundation for research and action,' but are often simply 'isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule.' Wittgenstein seems to suggest that in any culture, including our own, 'all enquiry...is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt...They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry.' In due course, an axiom may become 'fossilized.' It is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted onto an unused siding.' But it does not thereby lose its significance; rather, its significance has changed into that of a grammatical proposition. 'Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.'" (P392-393)
"Thus, as in the case of ordinary grammatical statements, if someone challenges an unshakable 'hinge' proposition from within the community or culture in question. 'I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.' 'What counts as a test?' The decisive point is that 'our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings.'" (P. 393)
"Wittgenstein remarks that one thinks one is looking at the nature of something, but 'one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.' It is in this context, and in this sense, that he observes, 'The problems are solved not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.'" (P. 404)
"The picture and the grammar which it suggests 'commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.' It is only by breaking the spell of a misleading picture that Wittgenstein can 'show the fly the way out of the bottle.'" (P. 404)
"More recently, special attention has been given to the far-reaching role of paradigms in the sciences, especially by Thomas S. Kuhn. Kuhn argues, for example, that the men who called Copernicus mad because he claimed that the earth moved were not 'just wrong.' The point was that 'part of what they mean by 'earth' was fixed position.' If 'earth' was a pardigm-case of fixity, Copernicus seemed to be making a self-contradictory claim. Only by changing their way of looking at things, and substituting a new paradigm, could the way be opened for an acceptance of his claims." (P. 405)
Our opponent can seem to be making a simple grammatical error, a basic blunder of logic, because our picture of reality and our language used to describe it already settles the case. I cannot even understand someone who disagrees with such a basic conception of the facts. He must be a simpleton!
Philosophy can help us become more adept at "breaking the spell" of these underlying conceptual structures, or at the very least can help us to bring them into the light.
"Cultural presuppositions, Hulme declares, become so much a part of the mind of the people of the given culture 'and lie so far back, that they are never really conscious of them. They do not see them, but other things through them.' They constitute 'doctrines seen as facts.' In due course we shall compare the idea of cultural presuppositions with some of Wittgenstein's observations in his last writing On Certainty, on what G.E. Moore had regarded as certainties of 'common sense.' They are certainties, Wittgenstein argues, in the sense that they are like hinges on which all our every day presuppositions turn. They perform a logical role not unlike that of the theological assertion 'it is written.' Such a proposition, Wittgenstein explains, 'gives our way of looking at things...their form...'" (P.74)
"They articulate 'the scaffolding of our thoughts'." (P 392)
"Within certain communities they have become virtually unquestioned or even unquestionable axioms; they function 'as a foundation for research and action,' but are often simply 'isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule.' Wittgenstein seems to suggest that in any culture, including our own, 'all enquiry...is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt...They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry.' In due course, an axiom may become 'fossilized.' It is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted onto an unused siding.' But it does not thereby lose its significance; rather, its significance has changed into that of a grammatical proposition. 'Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.'" (P392-393)
"Thus, as in the case of ordinary grammatical statements, if someone challenges an unshakable 'hinge' proposition from within the community or culture in question. 'I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.' 'What counts as a test?' The decisive point is that 'our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings.'" (P. 393)
"Wittgenstein remarks that one thinks one is looking at the nature of something, but 'one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.' It is in this context, and in this sense, that he observes, 'The problems are solved not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.'" (P. 404)
"The picture and the grammar which it suggests 'commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.' It is only by breaking the spell of a misleading picture that Wittgenstein can 'show the fly the way out of the bottle.'" (P. 404)
"More recently, special attention has been given to the far-reaching role of paradigms in the sciences, especially by Thomas S. Kuhn. Kuhn argues, for example, that the men who called Copernicus mad because he claimed that the earth moved were not 'just wrong.' The point was that 'part of what they mean by 'earth' was fixed position.' If 'earth' was a pardigm-case of fixity, Copernicus seemed to be making a self-contradictory claim. Only by changing their way of looking at things, and substituting a new paradigm, could the way be opened for an acceptance of his claims." (P. 405)
Our opponent can seem to be making a simple grammatical error, a basic blunder of logic, because our picture of reality and our language used to describe it already settles the case. I cannot even understand someone who disagrees with such a basic conception of the facts. He must be a simpleton!
Philosophy can help us become more adept at "breaking the spell" of these underlying conceptual structures, or at the very least can help us to bring them into the light.
Thursday, December 15, 2005
When two positions conflict
I follow a number of ongoing debates in theology, philosophy, and science. Many of these debates have raged for centuries and yet there are still two or more competing positions. Listening to some of the dialogue in the debates is discouraging at times, laughable at other times. Just some thoughts on what makes some positions intractable and some debates unfruitful:
1. All theories are underdetermined by the facts/evidence that support them (Quine). (see previous post)
2. Large systems that are internally consistent are naturally resistant to change. From the inside, everything makes perfect sense.
3. The higher the commitment to being right the more pressure there is to compromise the truth.
4. The more we have invested in a particular position, the more reluctant we are to abandon it, even in the face of increasing evidence against it.
5. Rhetorical tools can be used to make our argument appear stronger than it is and to make our opponents appear weaker than it is.
6. Isolation and insulation create a fortress mentality that results in an entire industry of defense. This undermines attention to being self-critical. In the pursuit of truth self-criticism is far more important than criticism of the dissenters.
7. Living in the fortress (box) makes it difficult to think outside the fortress (box). The more time I spend inside my "system" the less I can visualize any reasonable life outside of it.
8. Failure to appreciate how powerfully our presuppositions determine what we will admit as fact, how much weight we will give the facts we accept, and where the facts will be placed in our overall conceptualizing.
9. Laziness: Unwillingness to be rigorous in the development of our system and to be able to admit what is deduction and what is induction.
10. Frustration: We grow tired of the endless debate. We weary of the back and forth of argument and counterargument. We then either give up the dialogue or take shortcuts that undermine a fruitful process.
11. There are matters of community respect, financial reward, associations, and other disincentives that make it difficult for me to fully surrender to the pursuit of truth even if it means yielding some of my cherished beliefs.
12. Pride: I think that it is a shame to me to have held a position that I must now reject or radically alter, particularly if I have argued loudly against it in the past.
13. Semantics: The same or similar terms are being used in different ways and with different meanings in competing systems. This creates confusion and misunderstanding.
14. Lack of respect: Failure to value the opponent and to take him seriously as a human being.
15. Fear: I will defend irrationally whatever I am afraid of losing. This is particularly ture if I am unwilling to admit to myself what my non-negotiables are and why they are non-negotiable.
1. All theories are underdetermined by the facts/evidence that support them (Quine). (see previous post)
2. Large systems that are internally consistent are naturally resistant to change. From the inside, everything makes perfect sense.
3. The higher the commitment to being right the more pressure there is to compromise the truth.
4. The more we have invested in a particular position, the more reluctant we are to abandon it, even in the face of increasing evidence against it.
5. Rhetorical tools can be used to make our argument appear stronger than it is and to make our opponents appear weaker than it is.
6. Isolation and insulation create a fortress mentality that results in an entire industry of defense. This undermines attention to being self-critical. In the pursuit of truth self-criticism is far more important than criticism of the dissenters.
7. Living in the fortress (box) makes it difficult to think outside the fortress (box). The more time I spend inside my "system" the less I can visualize any reasonable life outside of it.
8. Failure to appreciate how powerfully our presuppositions determine what we will admit as fact, how much weight we will give the facts we accept, and where the facts will be placed in our overall conceptualizing.
9. Laziness: Unwillingness to be rigorous in the development of our system and to be able to admit what is deduction and what is induction.
10. Frustration: We grow tired of the endless debate. We weary of the back and forth of argument and counterargument. We then either give up the dialogue or take shortcuts that undermine a fruitful process.
11. There are matters of community respect, financial reward, associations, and other disincentives that make it difficult for me to fully surrender to the pursuit of truth even if it means yielding some of my cherished beliefs.
12. Pride: I think that it is a shame to me to have held a position that I must now reject or radically alter, particularly if I have argued loudly against it in the past.
13. Semantics: The same or similar terms are being used in different ways and with different meanings in competing systems. This creates confusion and misunderstanding.
14. Lack of respect: Failure to value the opponent and to take him seriously as a human being.
15. Fear: I will defend irrationally whatever I am afraid of losing. This is particularly ture if I am unwilling to admit to myself what my non-negotiables are and why they are non-negotiable.
Wednesday, December 07, 2005
Rhetorical tools
I was not able to find much by way of a science of evolution in Dawkin's two books, "The Blind Watchmaker" and "Climbing Mount Improbable." What I did find was a whole array of thought experiments each supporting other thought experiments. Certain rhetorical tools were employed to make these thought experiments more palatable. The two primary tools were these:
1. Imagine ever smaller increments of change.
2. Imagine ever larger amounts of time.
These two tools when applied rigorously and frequently have the effect of making the whole process appear natural, simple, and eminently reasonable. Since Dawkins has not engaged in anything that has required the use of the scientific method these tools only need to be applied to imaginative ideas.
If we are having trouble conceiving of any particular change we are told simply to imagine a smaller change, and if this is too difficult then to imagine an even smaller change. Eventually we will arrive at a change that is small enough that no one could reasonably object to it. Two immediate problems arise with this:
1. What if the change I imagine is so small as to make no difference to the survivability of the organism? Then no affirmative selection is likely to occur and our thought experiment fails. Dawkins wants us to imagine a change small enough that we can be comfortable with but requires that that imaginative change is large enough to prove his point.
2. What if the problem is not with small increments but with the mechanism of change itself? I might decide that I can jump across the Grand Canyon. Perhaps you have trouble believing my claim. But what if I tell you that I will train and aim to jump one inch more each week than the week before and in this way eventually leap the grand canyon. Perhaps if you have some experience with athletics you will think that increasing by an inch a week is to ambitious a goal to be reasonable. Well than imagine that I jump a half inch, a quarter of an inch, or one micrometer more each week. The flaw in this is that there may be certain limiting factors that cannot be transcended in reality by this thought experiment, even though it might seem reasonable to the mind. In the case of evolution it may well be that the problem of irreducible complexity is such a limiting factor. Some gaps can simply never be jumped no matter how many little steps we try to take toward overcoming the limitations or how long we have to try. Dawkins would like to use his rhetorical tools to steer us away from such objections.
The second tool, that of ever larger amounts of time, fails for the same reason. If something is not possible in principle then it is not possible in the moment or in eternity. I cannot conceive of the law of non-contradiction failing just because I imagine ever larger amounts of time in which it might have an opportunity to fail. What must be shown is that the mechanism of change is sound.
What has really happened with the use of these rhetorical tools is that we have moved away from Paley's watch to the watch of the hypnotist. The tools have a hypnotic effect but the use of them is fundamentally flawed because they beg the question of the soundness of the mechanism. We are frequently subjected to rhetorical enchantments. At times you can almost hear the hpnotist say: "Look at my watch, you're getting sleepy, you're getting very sleepy..." At times you can almost hear the organ music in the background.
1. Imagine ever smaller increments of change.
2. Imagine ever larger amounts of time.
These two tools when applied rigorously and frequently have the effect of making the whole process appear natural, simple, and eminently reasonable. Since Dawkins has not engaged in anything that has required the use of the scientific method these tools only need to be applied to imaginative ideas.
If we are having trouble conceiving of any particular change we are told simply to imagine a smaller change, and if this is too difficult then to imagine an even smaller change. Eventually we will arrive at a change that is small enough that no one could reasonably object to it. Two immediate problems arise with this:
1. What if the change I imagine is so small as to make no difference to the survivability of the organism? Then no affirmative selection is likely to occur and our thought experiment fails. Dawkins wants us to imagine a change small enough that we can be comfortable with but requires that that imaginative change is large enough to prove his point.
2. What if the problem is not with small increments but with the mechanism of change itself? I might decide that I can jump across the Grand Canyon. Perhaps you have trouble believing my claim. But what if I tell you that I will train and aim to jump one inch more each week than the week before and in this way eventually leap the grand canyon. Perhaps if you have some experience with athletics you will think that increasing by an inch a week is to ambitious a goal to be reasonable. Well than imagine that I jump a half inch, a quarter of an inch, or one micrometer more each week. The flaw in this is that there may be certain limiting factors that cannot be transcended in reality by this thought experiment, even though it might seem reasonable to the mind. In the case of evolution it may well be that the problem of irreducible complexity is such a limiting factor. Some gaps can simply never be jumped no matter how many little steps we try to take toward overcoming the limitations or how long we have to try. Dawkins would like to use his rhetorical tools to steer us away from such objections.
The second tool, that of ever larger amounts of time, fails for the same reason. If something is not possible in principle then it is not possible in the moment or in eternity. I cannot conceive of the law of non-contradiction failing just because I imagine ever larger amounts of time in which it might have an opportunity to fail. What must be shown is that the mechanism of change is sound.
What has really happened with the use of these rhetorical tools is that we have moved away from Paley's watch to the watch of the hypnotist. The tools have a hypnotic effect but the use of them is fundamentally flawed because they beg the question of the soundness of the mechanism. We are frequently subjected to rhetorical enchantments. At times you can almost hear the hpnotist say: "Look at my watch, you're getting sleepy, you're getting very sleepy..." At times you can almost hear the organ music in the background.
Sunday, December 04, 2005
How to dismiss an opponent
In "The Blind Watchmaker" Richard Dawkins makes the following two statements:
1. "No serious biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened..." P. 287
Now complete the syllogism:
X biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened
Therefore X biologist is not a serious biologist
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X biologist's arguments because he really isn't a serious biologist. He is dismissed.
2. "Modern theologians of any sophistication have given up believing in instantaneous creation." P. 316
Now complete the syllogism:
X theologian believes in instantaneous creation
Therefore X theologian is not a sophisticated theologian
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X theologians arguments because he really isn't a sophisticated theologian. He is dismissed.
Presumably the argument would continue:
3. No serious physicist ...
4. No serious chemist ...
5. No sophisticated philosopher ...
6. No serious geologist ...
7. No self-respecting dentist ...
What is wrong with this line of reasoning?:
False premise.
It is not possible to evaluate the seriousness or sophistication of someone's thinking based on one simple litmus test. The universe in which we live is just a little bit more complicated than that.
1. "No serious biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened..." P. 287
Now complete the syllogism:
X biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened
Therefore X biologist is not a serious biologist
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X biologist's arguments because he really isn't a serious biologist. He is dismissed.
2. "Modern theologians of any sophistication have given up believing in instantaneous creation." P. 316
Now complete the syllogism:
X theologian believes in instantaneous creation
Therefore X theologian is not a sophisticated theologian
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X theologians arguments because he really isn't a sophisticated theologian. He is dismissed.
Presumably the argument would continue:
3. No serious physicist ...
4. No serious chemist ...
5. No sophisticated philosopher ...
6. No serious geologist ...
7. No self-respecting dentist ...
What is wrong with this line of reasoning?:
False premise.
It is not possible to evaluate the seriousness or sophistication of someone's thinking based on one simple litmus test. The universe in which we live is just a little bit more complicated than that.
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