Lack of Agreement Among Philosophers

I'm reading Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968). In his opening chapter he writes:

"The lack of general agreement among philosophers, whether in different historical periods or at a given time, has been the cause of much criticism. Many of the differences in philosophical views may be attributed to the diversity of motives which lead thinkers to more ultimate speculation or inquiry."

You could replace the word philosophers with almost any branch of study and the statement would make as much sense. People often criticize various disciplines for their abundance of disunity and disagreement and point to this as evidence of the weakness of the discipline. On the contrary it is out of the multitude of views that critical debate arises and progress is made. I believe that this was Paul Feyerabend's point in recognizing and encouraging anarchism in the scientific disciplines. Science (and other disciplines) are weakened when there is too much pressure for conformity to particular theories and viewpoints. Only in a perfect world would perfect conformity be an asset. The key to making the most of our disagreements is to enter into and continue the dialogue.

Talking to the enemy

"If you want to make peace, you don't talk to your friends. You talk to your enemies." (Moshe Dayan)

While it is not always possible to talk to your enemy, the fact remains that much precious time is lost in the peace process by delaying the dialogue. The context of the above quote is a matter of international peace but I continue to explore the more mundane matter of dialogue between disparate parties with repect to issues of intellectual disagreement. This is a world of learning, insight, and understanding that inhabits the space of reasonable, respectful, and thoughtful dialogue between highly polarized positions. This fruitfulness awaits our willingness to release the desire to quickly dismiss, debunk, or demolish the enemy position.

If the above quote is true why do we not talk to our enemies? Some reasons immediately suggest themselves:

1. We believe that we are in a position to live without peace. The level of conflict is tolerable without any incentive to listen or compromise.
2. We blindly hate the enemy. Our history as enemies has created a great chasm or pronounced polarization. There is a deep inertia to hate that requires powerful motives to overcome.
3. We don't negotiate with________ (fill in the blank: terrorists, fundamentalists, liberals, conservatives, religious wingnuts, atheists, heretics...).
4. Dialogue is seen as a softening of our position. If I talk with my enemy I am already agreeing that my position isn't strong enough to stand alone in opposition to all other possible positions.
5. Talking to an enemy is seen as a sign of weakness. If I really believe in my position my enemy can go to hell.

Of course there is considerable mythology in the above reasons for avoiding dialogue and all the fruitfulness of discussion is delayed until something pushes us into a more hopeful relationship.

What elements might be necessary for talking to enemies?

1. Forgiveness. The enemy is dangerous and has done us much harm. We have a history that we cannot get past. Forgiveness is the only way past this history. There is no fruitful dialogue without at least one side extending forgiveness.
2. Listening. We have to be willing to hear that some of the argument and rationale of the enemy may be well founded.
3. Recognition of common ground. It helps the discussion considerably to affirm what both sides hold in common.
4. Find the "reasonable" people on each side, with whom the dialogue can begin.
5. Lose the rhetoric. In effect, disarm or at least declare a ceasefire.
6. Understand the non-negotiables on both sides. This keeps the discussion realistic.
7. Encourage hope for the possibility of a positive outcome, even if it is only a generous "agree to disagree."
8. See that your own position will likely be enriched through dialogue. Your strengths will be made stronger and you will have an opportunity to identify and minimize, or even eliminate, some of your weaknesses.
9. Recognize that "peace" and "agreement" are not necessarily the same thing.

"doctrines seen as facts"

I'm continuing to explore the reasons why, in certain debates, people holding different positions cannot give up the view that their opponent can only be dishonest, ignorant, or irrational. Certainly there are dishonest, ignorant, and irrational people out there but there is something more to this dynamic than this assessment suggests. Here are some ideas I came across in reading Anthony Thiselton's Two Horizons. Thiselton is discussing some ideas by G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty):

"Cultural presuppositions, Hulme declares, become so much a part of the mind of the people of the given culture 'and lie so far back, that they are never really conscious of them. They do not see them, but other things through them.' They constitute 'doctrines seen as facts.' In due course we shall compare the idea of cultural presuppositions with some of Wittgenstein's observations in his last writing On Certainty, on what G.E. Moore had regarded as certainties of 'common sense.' They are certainties, Wittgenstein argues, in the sense that they are like hinges on which all our every day presuppositions turn. They perform a logical role not unlike that of the theological assertion 'it is written.' Such a proposition, Wittgenstein explains, 'gives our way of looking at things...their form...'" (P.74)

"They articulate 'the scaffolding of our thoughts'." (P 392)

"Within certain communities they have become virtually unquestioned or even unquestionable axioms; they function 'as a foundation for research and action,' but are often simply 'isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule.' Wittgenstein seems to suggest that in any culture, including our own, 'all enquiry...is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt...They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry.' In due course, an axiom may become 'fossilized.' It is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted onto an unused siding.' But it does not thereby lose its significance; rather, its significance has changed into that of a grammatical proposition. 'Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.'" (P392-393)

"Thus, as in the case of ordinary grammatical statements, if someone challenges an unshakable 'hinge' proposition from within the community or culture in question. 'I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.' 'What counts as a test?' The decisive point is that 'our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings.'" (P. 393)

"Wittgenstein remarks that one thinks one is looking at the nature of something, but 'one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.' It is in this context, and in this sense, that he observes, 'The problems are solved not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.'" (P. 404)

"The picture and the grammar which it suggests 'commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.' It is only by breaking the spell of a misleading picture that Wittgenstein can 'show the fly the way out of the bottle.'" (P. 404)

"More recently, special attention has been given to the far-reaching role of paradigms in the sciences, especially by Thomas S. Kuhn. Kuhn argues, for example, that the men who called Copernicus mad because he claimed that the earth moved were not 'just wrong.' The point was that 'part of what they mean by 'earth' was fixed position.' If 'earth' was a pardigm-case of fixity, Copernicus seemed to be making a self-contradictory claim. Only by changing their way of looking at things, and substituting a new paradigm, could the way be opened for an acceptance of his claims." (P. 405)

Our opponent can seem to be making a simple grammatical error, a basic blunder of logic, because our picture of reality and our language used to describe it already settles the case. I cannot even understand someone who disagrees with such a basic conception of the facts. He must be a simpleton!

Philosophy can help us become more adept at "breaking the spell" of these underlying conceptual structures, or at the very least can help us to bring them into the light.