Plantinga on the Ontological Argument

Plantinga (God and Other Minds) thinks that Anselm's argument is best understood as a reductio ad absurdum and states it like this:

1) God exists in the understanding but not in reality - assumption for reductio
2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone - premise
3) A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality can be conceived - premise
4) A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality is greater than God - from 1) and 2)
5) A being greater than God can be conceived - 3), 4)
6) It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived - by definition of "God"
7) Hence it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality - 1) - 6), reductio ad absurdum

And so if God exists in the understanding, he also exists in reality; but clearly enough he does exist in the understanding (as even the fool will testify); accordingly he exists in reality as well.

Plantinga on The Problem of Evil

I'm continuing to read in Plantinga's "God and Other Minds" and found the chapter on the problem of evil interesting. Since this is probably the most frequently sited apologetic challenge I thought I would summarize his argument here.

The challenge: The existence of evil and the belief in an omnipotent and perfect God are contradictory beliefs. Plantinga suggests that this can be set forth in five propositions essential to traditional theism, with respect to the problem:

a) that God exists
b) that God is omnipotent
c) that God is omniscient
d) that God is wholly good
e) that evil exists

There is no formal contradiction in these five propositions. Some other proposition must be added to this to produce the contradiction. Such a proposition must be:

i) necessarily true

and/or

ii) an essential part of theism

or

iii) a logical consequence of such propositions

Finding an additional proposition that accomplishes the purpose intended has proven to be very elusive (Plantinga surveys the field of suggestions).

Now an omnipotent God is able to eliminate every case of evil and a perfectly good God would want to do so. Plantinga suggests that a proviso should be added to this: this is the case if, and only if, it does not require him to eliminate a greater good in order to do so.

This proviso throws a wrench into the atheological argument from evil. (Consider if Job's suffering produced a state of affairs which is a greater good than would have been the case if the evil had been prevented. The answer to this is at least arguable in the affirmative.)

The atheologian must now prove that unjustified evil exists. That is, "there is at least one evil state of affairs such that for every good that entails it, there is a greater good that does not."

The atheist must show that it is logically impossible that there is evil and that all of it is justified. In other words, "If there is any evil in the world, then there is unjustified evil" must be shown to be a necessarily true proposition. Very difficult to do.

Verifiability criterion of meaning

Reading Alvin Plantinga: "God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God"

In this book Plantinga has a chapter entitled "Verificationism and Other Atheologica". I found it interesting because it is still quite common to hear people trying to end debate on one thing or another by saying "it can't be verified by empirical evidence" or "this statement has no meaning because it cannot be falsified."

Plantinga looks particularly at Anthony Flew's discussion about verification and makes some interesting responses to this debate:

"It appears, then, that according to Flew a meaningful (contingent) proposition must be falsifiable by observation statements; there must be some finite and consistent set of observation statements that entail its denial."

This is the Verifiability Criterion of Meaning and it assumes that only empiricism can provide a valid philosophy of truth. But Plantinga points out that the history of the attempts to clearly define a verifiability criteria show that it has failed to demonstrate any effective use as a tool for evaluating truth and meaning.

"The fact is that no one has succeeded in stating a version of the verifiability criterion that is even remotely plausible; and by now the project is beginning to look unhopeful."

To suggest that religious statements are or are not verifiable is an empty challenge when no fruitful verifiability criterion for the truth of anything can be put forward. The only possible way of stating a verifiability criterion that might be of some use would be to establish the criterion by fiat: "the statements of science and 'common sense' are meaningful, all others are not." This effectively is what many scientists and philosophers have tried to do.

It cannot be demonstrated that a statement or proposition that cannot be falsified is not meaningful or true. "Unconditional love exists" can neither be verified nor falsified, yet it is still a meaningful statement and is still arguably true.