Here are a couple more quotes from Anthony Thiselton's "New Horizons in Hermeneutics" with respect to scientific objectivity. These quotes are with reference to some ideas of Heidegger and Gadamer.
"For Heidegger, what is 'objective,' including making assertions about 'facts,' is derivative from, and dependent on, hermeneutical understanding from within a given horizon. The fact-stating language of the sciences has its place, but only at a merely technical or instrumental level."
(P. 319)
Re Gadamer's thought:
"The physical sciences appear to operate on an empirical, rational, or observational basis, but in actuality these are presuppositions in 'possibilities of knowing' which are left 'half in the dark.' For example, the science of statistics seems to be an exact observational and mathematical discipline based only on 'the facts.' But 'which questions these facts answer, and which facts would begin to speak if other questions were asked, are hermeneutical questions.' Much depends in research in the sciences on 'noticing the interesting fact,' or the use of imagination, and on the posing of the right question...' Hermeneutics concerns all human enquiry."
(P. 322)
Within its own world science is, for the mostpart, rational, objective, observational and based on 'the facts.' This is both a true and a superficial observation. A scientist's claim to objectivity does not amount to as much as he may think it does. It is not all that difficult to create a philosophical space for your work and then to remain consistent and objective within it. Every worldview, including the scientific one, does this. What many scientists have difficulty recognizing is that the foundation of their discipline is philosophically based. The objectivity of science does not extend beyond that philosophical commitment and cannot. Science may be founded on any number of philosophical (or religious) foundations and maintain within itself the same objectivity and commitment to 'the facts.' The doing of science and the founding of science are two very distinct enterprises and must each be carefully respected as such. Science itself is not a worldview but it is never practiced independently of a worldview. This is what Heidegger and Gadamer are seeking to point out.
Showing posts with label Objectivity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Objectivity. Show all posts
Saturday, February 18, 2006
Thursday, January 12, 2006
"doctrines seen as facts"
I'm continuing to explore the reasons why, in certain debates, people holding different positions cannot give up the view that their opponent can only be dishonest, ignorant, or irrational. Certainly there are dishonest, ignorant, and irrational people out there but there is something more to this dynamic than this assessment suggests. Here are some ideas I came across in reading Anthony Thiselton's Two Horizons. Thiselton is discussing some ideas by G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty):
"Cultural presuppositions, Hulme declares, become so much a part of the mind of the people of the given culture 'and lie so far back, that they are never really conscious of them. They do not see them, but other things through them.' They constitute 'doctrines seen as facts.' In due course we shall compare the idea of cultural presuppositions with some of Wittgenstein's observations in his last writing On Certainty, on what G.E. Moore had regarded as certainties of 'common sense.' They are certainties, Wittgenstein argues, in the sense that they are like hinges on which all our every day presuppositions turn. They perform a logical role not unlike that of the theological assertion 'it is written.' Such a proposition, Wittgenstein explains, 'gives our way of looking at things...their form...'" (P.74)
"They articulate 'the scaffolding of our thoughts'." (P 392)
"Within certain communities they have become virtually unquestioned or even unquestionable axioms; they function 'as a foundation for research and action,' but are often simply 'isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule.' Wittgenstein seems to suggest that in any culture, including our own, 'all enquiry...is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt...They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry.' In due course, an axiom may become 'fossilized.' It is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted onto an unused siding.' But it does not thereby lose its significance; rather, its significance has changed into that of a grammatical proposition. 'Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.'" (P392-393)
"Thus, as in the case of ordinary grammatical statements, if someone challenges an unshakable 'hinge' proposition from within the community or culture in question. 'I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.' 'What counts as a test?' The decisive point is that 'our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings.'" (P. 393)
"Wittgenstein remarks that one thinks one is looking at the nature of something, but 'one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.' It is in this context, and in this sense, that he observes, 'The problems are solved not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.'" (P. 404)
"The picture and the grammar which it suggests 'commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.' It is only by breaking the spell of a misleading picture that Wittgenstein can 'show the fly the way out of the bottle.'" (P. 404)
"More recently, special attention has been given to the far-reaching role of paradigms in the sciences, especially by Thomas S. Kuhn. Kuhn argues, for example, that the men who called Copernicus mad because he claimed that the earth moved were not 'just wrong.' The point was that 'part of what they mean by 'earth' was fixed position.' If 'earth' was a pardigm-case of fixity, Copernicus seemed to be making a self-contradictory claim. Only by changing their way of looking at things, and substituting a new paradigm, could the way be opened for an acceptance of his claims." (P. 405)
Our opponent can seem to be making a simple grammatical error, a basic blunder of logic, because our picture of reality and our language used to describe it already settles the case. I cannot even understand someone who disagrees with such a basic conception of the facts. He must be a simpleton!
Philosophy can help us become more adept at "breaking the spell" of these underlying conceptual structures, or at the very least can help us to bring them into the light.
"Cultural presuppositions, Hulme declares, become so much a part of the mind of the people of the given culture 'and lie so far back, that they are never really conscious of them. They do not see them, but other things through them.' They constitute 'doctrines seen as facts.' In due course we shall compare the idea of cultural presuppositions with some of Wittgenstein's observations in his last writing On Certainty, on what G.E. Moore had regarded as certainties of 'common sense.' They are certainties, Wittgenstein argues, in the sense that they are like hinges on which all our every day presuppositions turn. They perform a logical role not unlike that of the theological assertion 'it is written.' Such a proposition, Wittgenstein explains, 'gives our way of looking at things...their form...'" (P.74)
"They articulate 'the scaffolding of our thoughts'." (P 392)
"Within certain communities they have become virtually unquestioned or even unquestionable axioms; they function 'as a foundation for research and action,' but are often simply 'isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule.' Wittgenstein seems to suggest that in any culture, including our own, 'all enquiry...is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt...They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry.' In due course, an axiom may become 'fossilized.' It is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted onto an unused siding.' But it does not thereby lose its significance; rather, its significance has changed into that of a grammatical proposition. 'Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.'" (P392-393)
"Thus, as in the case of ordinary grammatical statements, if someone challenges an unshakable 'hinge' proposition from within the community or culture in question. 'I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.' 'What counts as a test?' The decisive point is that 'our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings.'" (P. 393)
"Wittgenstein remarks that one thinks one is looking at the nature of something, but 'one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.' It is in this context, and in this sense, that he observes, 'The problems are solved not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.'" (P. 404)
"The picture and the grammar which it suggests 'commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.' It is only by breaking the spell of a misleading picture that Wittgenstein can 'show the fly the way out of the bottle.'" (P. 404)
"More recently, special attention has been given to the far-reaching role of paradigms in the sciences, especially by Thomas S. Kuhn. Kuhn argues, for example, that the men who called Copernicus mad because he claimed that the earth moved were not 'just wrong.' The point was that 'part of what they mean by 'earth' was fixed position.' If 'earth' was a pardigm-case of fixity, Copernicus seemed to be making a self-contradictory claim. Only by changing their way of looking at things, and substituting a new paradigm, could the way be opened for an acceptance of his claims." (P. 405)
Our opponent can seem to be making a simple grammatical error, a basic blunder of logic, because our picture of reality and our language used to describe it already settles the case. I cannot even understand someone who disagrees with such a basic conception of the facts. He must be a simpleton!
Philosophy can help us become more adept at "breaking the spell" of these underlying conceptual structures, or at the very least can help us to bring them into the light.
Saturday, December 24, 2005
Methods of inquiry
In Anthony Thiselton's (The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description) discussion of Heidegger he has some comments to make about the relationship between Heidegger's thought and that of T.F. Torrance with respect to scientific method and the epistemological task. Thiselton writes:
"True 'objectivity,' if this is the right word at all, depends on the appropriateness of the method of inquiry to the obect of inquiry. We do not prescribe the same methods in advance of all inquiries, on the assumption that one particular model of the act of knowledge is the only 'objective' one." (P. 188)
If we attempt to universalize the scientific method as the only appropriate method of inquiry for all objects of inquiry then many possible worlds of knowledge are eliminated as legitimate objects by definition. If the scientific method is the only method of inquiry we have then we have put strict limits on what we can even raise questions about. This is the "if my only tool is a hammer, then every problem is a nail" approach to simplifying the epistemological task.
Andrew Rowell, in his blog, ID in the United Kingdom, comments about the lack of awareness amongst many scientists of the role that a worldview plays in how we think and defend our positions. In his post, "The Darwinist Propaganda Carnival continues...," he writes:
"Thus scientists have crossed over the line between the pursuit of truth to the defence of a worldview (italics and bold type mine). The odd thing is that they do not seem to realise what they are doing. Most of them simply have no concept that there is such a thing as a “worldview” they are so immersed in their own view of the world that they don’t really believe that there can be anything else other than naturalism without it deserving to be in a padded clinic.
Scientists (especially biologists trained to think in exclusively evolutionist fashion) are poorly placed to draw the distinctions between belief based upon evidence and belief based upon worldview.
Evolution provides poor resources for explaining the huge problems of the origins of life and the origins of huge amounts of complex machinery which makes our best efforts at technology look very clumsy indeed. To pretend that we have demonstrated that unintelligent causes provide a full explanation for all this is dishonest."
When our object of inquiry shifts, our method of inquiry may have to shift as well. This goes some way towards explaining how people who are brilliant in their field may begin to talk nonsense when they cross over to another field of knowledge that is inappropiate to their familiar methods.
"True 'objectivity,' if this is the right word at all, depends on the appropriateness of the method of inquiry to the obect of inquiry. We do not prescribe the same methods in advance of all inquiries, on the assumption that one particular model of the act of knowledge is the only 'objective' one." (P. 188)
If we attempt to universalize the scientific method as the only appropriate method of inquiry for all objects of inquiry then many possible worlds of knowledge are eliminated as legitimate objects by definition. If the scientific method is the only method of inquiry we have then we have put strict limits on what we can even raise questions about. This is the "if my only tool is a hammer, then every problem is a nail" approach to simplifying the epistemological task.
Andrew Rowell, in his blog, ID in the United Kingdom, comments about the lack of awareness amongst many scientists of the role that a worldview plays in how we think and defend our positions. In his post, "The Darwinist Propaganda Carnival continues...," he writes:
"Thus scientists have crossed over the line between the pursuit of truth to the defence of a worldview (italics and bold type mine). The odd thing is that they do not seem to realise what they are doing. Most of them simply have no concept that there is such a thing as a “worldview” they are so immersed in their own view of the world that they don’t really believe that there can be anything else other than naturalism without it deserving to be in a padded clinic.
Scientists (especially biologists trained to think in exclusively evolutionist fashion) are poorly placed to draw the distinctions between belief based upon evidence and belief based upon worldview.
Evolution provides poor resources for explaining the huge problems of the origins of life and the origins of huge amounts of complex machinery which makes our best efforts at technology look very clumsy indeed. To pretend that we have demonstrated that unintelligent causes provide a full explanation for all this is dishonest."
When our object of inquiry shifts, our method of inquiry may have to shift as well. This goes some way towards explaining how people who are brilliant in their field may begin to talk nonsense when they cross over to another field of knowledge that is inappropiate to their familiar methods.
Tuesday, December 20, 2005
Pre-understanding
Pre-understanding is a technical term used in theology and philosophy of language to refer to what we unreflectively bring with us to the reading of a text. I am particularly interested in the role pre-understanding has to play in the interpretation of the Bible. The subject is both fascinating and important because it raises questions about our ability to understand the Bible (or any text). Thinking about this also helps towards an understanding of why we often find ourselves in conflict with one another about what the Bible says. We are surprised that what is clear to us is not clear to someone else. We want to know why we can't just read the Bible and let it say to us whatever it has to say and be done with it. One of the reasons is the problem of pre-understanding. We don't come to the Bible with a blank mind, waiting for the Bible to write across our consciousness whatever it pleases. We come to the Bible out of a particular culture, with a certain world view, with a set of things that we think we already know and understand, with certain bottom lines about what is reasonable and what is not, and so on. These things, that we come to the Bible with, affect the way we hear the Bible, aid in our interpretation, and direct the way we read the text and draw concepts and conclusions from it. This is unavoidable, the goal is not to come to the text with a blank mind but to make the effort to understand the mind that we are bringing to the text. There is no escaping the problems that are raised by this. It is logically impossible to come to the text with no understanding. I come with my pre-understanding and if I make an effort to be aware of what I am bringing to the text I may be prepared to make some changes in my world view where the text may seem to demand it. If this happens I can then have a refined pre-understanding which I will in turn bring back to the text the next time I read it. My world-view tells me how to interpret the text. I may wish to return to my naive position where I believed that the Bible was speaking to me and I was passively listening. Once I have begun to reflect on the problem of pre-understanding I can no longer be this naive. I am not a passive listener. I am shaping the meaning of the text as fast as the words are coming off the page and entering my mind.
As a simple starting place for reflecting on this consider the hermeneutical circle. The hermeutical circle says that I read a particular text and it helps me develop my global understanding of what the whole book is about. In Biblical terms we are talking about the relationship between exegesis and theology. I study a small passage of Scripture, seek to understand what it is saying and attempt to find a place for that in the development of my theology as a whole. The circle part comes in because, all the while, my theology is informing my interpretation of the particular passage that I am seeking to exegete. I don't reject my entire theological system in order to freshly interpret, without any pre-understanding, the text at hand. On the other hand, I don't want my theological system to be immune from challenge by a particular text. This presents a problem in reading that Bible that is best addressed by being aware of the problem. Creating a theology is a way of organizing everything I am learning from my regular reading of the text. This organizing begins to create a conceptual system that can become so complete and compelling that particular texts can no longer successfully challenge the sytem, they must be assimilated into it. My theological system becomes a pre-understanding that forces itself upon my reading of Scripture. Someone with a different theological pre-understanding becomes a conundrum to me when I see how he is reading a passage of Scripture that "obviously" means something quite different than he thinks it does.
The problem of pre-understanding is much bigger than this limited description of the hermeneutical circle. It takes in everything I think and believe about the world, in particular everything I unreflectively think and believe, everything that seems self-evident and obvious to me. Whatever I was when I came into the world I am definitely no tabula rasa by the time I begin to read the Bible. This is important because, if the Bible is the Word of God, it is most important that it be able to speak to me and to my world. If I am distorting its message every time I read it I had better at least be aware of it.
I believe that Herman Dooyeweerd has at least pointed the way to a corrective in his concept of a transcendental critique of culture.
As a simple starting place for reflecting on this consider the hermeneutical circle. The hermeutical circle says that I read a particular text and it helps me develop my global understanding of what the whole book is about. In Biblical terms we are talking about the relationship between exegesis and theology. I study a small passage of Scripture, seek to understand what it is saying and attempt to find a place for that in the development of my theology as a whole. The circle part comes in because, all the while, my theology is informing my interpretation of the particular passage that I am seeking to exegete. I don't reject my entire theological system in order to freshly interpret, without any pre-understanding, the text at hand. On the other hand, I don't want my theological system to be immune from challenge by a particular text. This presents a problem in reading that Bible that is best addressed by being aware of the problem. Creating a theology is a way of organizing everything I am learning from my regular reading of the text. This organizing begins to create a conceptual system that can become so complete and compelling that particular texts can no longer successfully challenge the sytem, they must be assimilated into it. My theological system becomes a pre-understanding that forces itself upon my reading of Scripture. Someone with a different theological pre-understanding becomes a conundrum to me when I see how he is reading a passage of Scripture that "obviously" means something quite different than he thinks it does.
The problem of pre-understanding is much bigger than this limited description of the hermeneutical circle. It takes in everything I think and believe about the world, in particular everything I unreflectively think and believe, everything that seems self-evident and obvious to me. Whatever I was when I came into the world I am definitely no tabula rasa by the time I begin to read the Bible. This is important because, if the Bible is the Word of God, it is most important that it be able to speak to me and to my world. If I am distorting its message every time I read it I had better at least be aware of it.
I believe that Herman Dooyeweerd has at least pointed the way to a corrective in his concept of a transcendental critique of culture.
Thursday, December 15, 2005
When two positions conflict
I follow a number of ongoing debates in theology, philosophy, and science. Many of these debates have raged for centuries and yet there are still two or more competing positions. Listening to some of the dialogue in the debates is discouraging at times, laughable at other times. Just some thoughts on what makes some positions intractable and some debates unfruitful:
1. All theories are underdetermined by the facts/evidence that support them (Quine). (see previous post)
2. Large systems that are internally consistent are naturally resistant to change. From the inside, everything makes perfect sense.
3. The higher the commitment to being right the more pressure there is to compromise the truth.
4. The more we have invested in a particular position, the more reluctant we are to abandon it, even in the face of increasing evidence against it.
5. Rhetorical tools can be used to make our argument appear stronger than it is and to make our opponents appear weaker than it is.
6. Isolation and insulation create a fortress mentality that results in an entire industry of defense. This undermines attention to being self-critical. In the pursuit of truth self-criticism is far more important than criticism of the dissenters.
7. Living in the fortress (box) makes it difficult to think outside the fortress (box). The more time I spend inside my "system" the less I can visualize any reasonable life outside of it.
8. Failure to appreciate how powerfully our presuppositions determine what we will admit as fact, how much weight we will give the facts we accept, and where the facts will be placed in our overall conceptualizing.
9. Laziness: Unwillingness to be rigorous in the development of our system and to be able to admit what is deduction and what is induction.
10. Frustration: We grow tired of the endless debate. We weary of the back and forth of argument and counterargument. We then either give up the dialogue or take shortcuts that undermine a fruitful process.
11. There are matters of community respect, financial reward, associations, and other disincentives that make it difficult for me to fully surrender to the pursuit of truth even if it means yielding some of my cherished beliefs.
12. Pride: I think that it is a shame to me to have held a position that I must now reject or radically alter, particularly if I have argued loudly against it in the past.
13. Semantics: The same or similar terms are being used in different ways and with different meanings in competing systems. This creates confusion and misunderstanding.
14. Lack of respect: Failure to value the opponent and to take him seriously as a human being.
15. Fear: I will defend irrationally whatever I am afraid of losing. This is particularly ture if I am unwilling to admit to myself what my non-negotiables are and why they are non-negotiable.
1. All theories are underdetermined by the facts/evidence that support them (Quine). (see previous post)
2. Large systems that are internally consistent are naturally resistant to change. From the inside, everything makes perfect sense.
3. The higher the commitment to being right the more pressure there is to compromise the truth.
4. The more we have invested in a particular position, the more reluctant we are to abandon it, even in the face of increasing evidence against it.
5. Rhetorical tools can be used to make our argument appear stronger than it is and to make our opponents appear weaker than it is.
6. Isolation and insulation create a fortress mentality that results in an entire industry of defense. This undermines attention to being self-critical. In the pursuit of truth self-criticism is far more important than criticism of the dissenters.
7. Living in the fortress (box) makes it difficult to think outside the fortress (box). The more time I spend inside my "system" the less I can visualize any reasonable life outside of it.
8. Failure to appreciate how powerfully our presuppositions determine what we will admit as fact, how much weight we will give the facts we accept, and where the facts will be placed in our overall conceptualizing.
9. Laziness: Unwillingness to be rigorous in the development of our system and to be able to admit what is deduction and what is induction.
10. Frustration: We grow tired of the endless debate. We weary of the back and forth of argument and counterargument. We then either give up the dialogue or take shortcuts that undermine a fruitful process.
11. There are matters of community respect, financial reward, associations, and other disincentives that make it difficult for me to fully surrender to the pursuit of truth even if it means yielding some of my cherished beliefs.
12. Pride: I think that it is a shame to me to have held a position that I must now reject or radically alter, particularly if I have argued loudly against it in the past.
13. Semantics: The same or similar terms are being used in different ways and with different meanings in competing systems. This creates confusion and misunderstanding.
14. Lack of respect: Failure to value the opponent and to take him seriously as a human being.
15. Fear: I will defend irrationally whatever I am afraid of losing. This is particularly ture if I am unwilling to admit to myself what my non-negotiables are and why they are non-negotiable.
Sunday, December 11, 2005
Willard Quine
Willard Quine (1908-2000) was a mathematician and philosopher of science at Harvard University for 44 years. I have found Quine to be very helpful in trying to understand why there are so many unsolved debates in every field of thinking and research. Quine stated that every theory is underdetermined by the facts or evidence that supports it. Every theorist takes the available evidence and organizes it into a coherent and internally consistent monolith. It is easy to understand why there might be two or more theories that are contradictory but that are both internally consistent and that both utilize the same set of facts. No system can incorporate all of the facts when constructing its theory. One system will place more weight on some evidence and less on other evidence. One system will ignore certain facts while another system incorporates them.
I find this helpful in explaining the persistent theological (Calvinism vs. Arminianism etc.), philosophical (freedom vs. determinism etc.), political (one form of government vs. another etc.), and scientific (Intelligent Design vs. naturalistic evolution etc.) debates.
What I wonder is whether it is better to hold some contradictory beliefs both of which seem to describe important truths than to resolve the contradictions in favor of an internally consistent theory. Resolving the conflict in this way can end a fruitful debate and make the important issues that they represent disappear. Loyalty to a theory through this kind of resolution might actually have the effect of barricading us against the truth. There is a tremendous pull towards keeping everything consistent and towards averting as quickly as possible any contradictions that might create confusion. I believe it was Emerson who said that "consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds." The resolution of important issues into neatly defined camps can have the effect of polarizing, even ghetoizing, the debate. The important thing then becomes defending the camp, rather than pursuing the truth. This has led many debates into endless talking past each other, ad hominem argumentation, and fruitless rhetorical tricks.
I find this helpful in explaining the persistent theological (Calvinism vs. Arminianism etc.), philosophical (freedom vs. determinism etc.), political (one form of government vs. another etc.), and scientific (Intelligent Design vs. naturalistic evolution etc.) debates.
What I wonder is whether it is better to hold some contradictory beliefs both of which seem to describe important truths than to resolve the contradictions in favor of an internally consistent theory. Resolving the conflict in this way can end a fruitful debate and make the important issues that they represent disappear. Loyalty to a theory through this kind of resolution might actually have the effect of barricading us against the truth. There is a tremendous pull towards keeping everything consistent and towards averting as quickly as possible any contradictions that might create confusion. I believe it was Emerson who said that "consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds." The resolution of important issues into neatly defined camps can have the effect of polarizing, even ghetoizing, the debate. The important thing then becomes defending the camp, rather than pursuing the truth. This has led many debates into endless talking past each other, ad hominem argumentation, and fruitless rhetorical tricks.
Wednesday, December 07, 2005
Rhetorical tools
I was not able to find much by way of a science of evolution in Dawkin's two books, "The Blind Watchmaker" and "Climbing Mount Improbable." What I did find was a whole array of thought experiments each supporting other thought experiments. Certain rhetorical tools were employed to make these thought experiments more palatable. The two primary tools were these:
1. Imagine ever smaller increments of change.
2. Imagine ever larger amounts of time.
These two tools when applied rigorously and frequently have the effect of making the whole process appear natural, simple, and eminently reasonable. Since Dawkins has not engaged in anything that has required the use of the scientific method these tools only need to be applied to imaginative ideas.
If we are having trouble conceiving of any particular change we are told simply to imagine a smaller change, and if this is too difficult then to imagine an even smaller change. Eventually we will arrive at a change that is small enough that no one could reasonably object to it. Two immediate problems arise with this:
1. What if the change I imagine is so small as to make no difference to the survivability of the organism? Then no affirmative selection is likely to occur and our thought experiment fails. Dawkins wants us to imagine a change small enough that we can be comfortable with but requires that that imaginative change is large enough to prove his point.
2. What if the problem is not with small increments but with the mechanism of change itself? I might decide that I can jump across the Grand Canyon. Perhaps you have trouble believing my claim. But what if I tell you that I will train and aim to jump one inch more each week than the week before and in this way eventually leap the grand canyon. Perhaps if you have some experience with athletics you will think that increasing by an inch a week is to ambitious a goal to be reasonable. Well than imagine that I jump a half inch, a quarter of an inch, or one micrometer more each week. The flaw in this is that there may be certain limiting factors that cannot be transcended in reality by this thought experiment, even though it might seem reasonable to the mind. In the case of evolution it may well be that the problem of irreducible complexity is such a limiting factor. Some gaps can simply never be jumped no matter how many little steps we try to take toward overcoming the limitations or how long we have to try. Dawkins would like to use his rhetorical tools to steer us away from such objections.
The second tool, that of ever larger amounts of time, fails for the same reason. If something is not possible in principle then it is not possible in the moment or in eternity. I cannot conceive of the law of non-contradiction failing just because I imagine ever larger amounts of time in which it might have an opportunity to fail. What must be shown is that the mechanism of change is sound.
What has really happened with the use of these rhetorical tools is that we have moved away from Paley's watch to the watch of the hypnotist. The tools have a hypnotic effect but the use of them is fundamentally flawed because they beg the question of the soundness of the mechanism. We are frequently subjected to rhetorical enchantments. At times you can almost hear the hpnotist say: "Look at my watch, you're getting sleepy, you're getting very sleepy..." At times you can almost hear the organ music in the background.
1. Imagine ever smaller increments of change.
2. Imagine ever larger amounts of time.
These two tools when applied rigorously and frequently have the effect of making the whole process appear natural, simple, and eminently reasonable. Since Dawkins has not engaged in anything that has required the use of the scientific method these tools only need to be applied to imaginative ideas.
If we are having trouble conceiving of any particular change we are told simply to imagine a smaller change, and if this is too difficult then to imagine an even smaller change. Eventually we will arrive at a change that is small enough that no one could reasonably object to it. Two immediate problems arise with this:
1. What if the change I imagine is so small as to make no difference to the survivability of the organism? Then no affirmative selection is likely to occur and our thought experiment fails. Dawkins wants us to imagine a change small enough that we can be comfortable with but requires that that imaginative change is large enough to prove his point.
2. What if the problem is not with small increments but with the mechanism of change itself? I might decide that I can jump across the Grand Canyon. Perhaps you have trouble believing my claim. But what if I tell you that I will train and aim to jump one inch more each week than the week before and in this way eventually leap the grand canyon. Perhaps if you have some experience with athletics you will think that increasing by an inch a week is to ambitious a goal to be reasonable. Well than imagine that I jump a half inch, a quarter of an inch, or one micrometer more each week. The flaw in this is that there may be certain limiting factors that cannot be transcended in reality by this thought experiment, even though it might seem reasonable to the mind. In the case of evolution it may well be that the problem of irreducible complexity is such a limiting factor. Some gaps can simply never be jumped no matter how many little steps we try to take toward overcoming the limitations or how long we have to try. Dawkins would like to use his rhetorical tools to steer us away from such objections.
The second tool, that of ever larger amounts of time, fails for the same reason. If something is not possible in principle then it is not possible in the moment or in eternity. I cannot conceive of the law of non-contradiction failing just because I imagine ever larger amounts of time in which it might have an opportunity to fail. What must be shown is that the mechanism of change is sound.
What has really happened with the use of these rhetorical tools is that we have moved away from Paley's watch to the watch of the hypnotist. The tools have a hypnotic effect but the use of them is fundamentally flawed because they beg the question of the soundness of the mechanism. We are frequently subjected to rhetorical enchantments. At times you can almost hear the hpnotist say: "Look at my watch, you're getting sleepy, you're getting very sleepy..." At times you can almost hear the organ music in the background.
Sunday, December 04, 2005
How to dismiss an opponent
In "The Blind Watchmaker" Richard Dawkins makes the following two statements:
1. "No serious biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened..." P. 287
Now complete the syllogism:
X biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened
Therefore X biologist is not a serious biologist
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X biologist's arguments because he really isn't a serious biologist. He is dismissed.
2. "Modern theologians of any sophistication have given up believing in instantaneous creation." P. 316
Now complete the syllogism:
X theologian believes in instantaneous creation
Therefore X theologian is not a sophisticated theologian
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X theologians arguments because he really isn't a sophisticated theologian. He is dismissed.
Presumably the argument would continue:
3. No serious physicist ...
4. No serious chemist ...
5. No sophisticated philosopher ...
6. No serious geologist ...
7. No self-respecting dentist ...
What is wrong with this line of reasoning?:
False premise.
It is not possible to evaluate the seriousness or sophistication of someone's thinking based on one simple litmus test. The universe in which we live is just a little bit more complicated than that.
1. "No serious biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened..." P. 287
Now complete the syllogism:
X biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened
Therefore X biologist is not a serious biologist
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X biologist's arguments because he really isn't a serious biologist. He is dismissed.
2. "Modern theologians of any sophistication have given up believing in instantaneous creation." P. 316
Now complete the syllogism:
X theologian believes in instantaneous creation
Therefore X theologian is not a sophisticated theologian
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X theologians arguments because he really isn't a sophisticated theologian. He is dismissed.
Presumably the argument would continue:
3. No serious physicist ...
4. No serious chemist ...
5. No sophisticated philosopher ...
6. No serious geologist ...
7. No self-respecting dentist ...
What is wrong with this line of reasoning?:
False premise.
It is not possible to evaluate the seriousness or sophistication of someone's thinking based on one simple litmus test. The universe in which we live is just a little bit more complicated than that.
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