Assumptions and Premises in Philosophy

Continuing to read Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968).

"Speculation in philosophy takes the form of hypotheses about the ultimate nature of reality, or the interpretation of existence in terms of one or more basic principles. Finally, the ideal of arranging the body of philosophic knowledge in the form of a deductive system is set up as an ultimate goal. Such a program has the advantage of making clear just what is assumed; and assumptions have been seen to be unavoidable."

This is one of the most important contributions that philosophy makes to every other cognitive enterprise. It reveals that at the bottom of every belief system, including the scientific one, are a set of hypotheses and assumptions that have been adopted in order to have a starting place for constructing the deductive system that derives from these premises. Neither science, nor philosophy, nor religion can construct successful rationalistic proofs for the truth of their foundational assumptions. These assumptions must be taken as a matter of faith in order to proceed with the task of making sense of the world. Faith based assumptions sit at the bottom of every philosophical, scientific, and religious worldview. An examination of these premises is and their implications for our understanding of reality is what constitutes the material for a transcendental critique that reveals the strengths and weaknesses of each system.

The problem of Self-Evidence

Continuing to read Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968).

"Although, he (Schopenhauer) advises his readers to view the 'self-evident' as a problem, he is unable to question his own conception of the understanding, with its alleged forms and limits. This shows how difficult it is for a philosopher to be aware of his own premises and assumed entities, and how he may fail to see what a later generation comes to see clearly."

Here are a few thoughts provoked by Faber's comment on Schopenhauer:

1. The problem of "self-evidence"
The problem lies in the subjectivity of the observer. It is based on what is evident to me. Since no observer is neutral we need to be aware of the ultimate assumptions we are making that affect our observation and why we have chosen to adopt those assumptions. Adoption is the correct word here because every philosophical position is built on one or more premises which are assumed but cannot be rationally proven. We assume the premises we do, not arbitrarily, but because we believe they are able to make the best sense out of the "facts" at hand.

2. The goal in questioning the "self-evident" is not to rid ourselves of all unproven premises (unless we wish to affirm a radical skepticism). The goal in questioning the "self-evident" is to ensure that we understand what our ultimate premises are, whether what is evident to myself reflects these premises, and whether in the end I am still willing to commit to these premises.

3. Awareness of our premises can be enhanced through some form of distancing. This can occur through the passing of time ("what a later generation comes to see clearly"), through clarifying the motivations that may affect our choice of premises, through the detachment achieved by applying a consistent analytical methodology, etc.

Lack of Agreement Among Philosophers

I'm reading Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968). In his opening chapter he writes:

"The lack of general agreement among philosophers, whether in different historical periods or at a given time, has been the cause of much criticism. Many of the differences in philosophical views may be attributed to the diversity of motives which lead thinkers to more ultimate speculation or inquiry."

You could replace the word philosophers with almost any branch of study and the statement would make as much sense. People often criticize various disciplines for their abundance of disunity and disagreement and point to this as evidence of the weakness of the discipline. On the contrary it is out of the multitude of views that critical debate arises and progress is made. I believe that this was Paul Feyerabend's point in recognizing and encouraging anarchism in the scientific disciplines. Science (and other disciplines) are weakened when there is too much pressure for conformity to particular theories and viewpoints. Only in a perfect world would perfect conformity be an asset. The key to making the most of our disagreements is to enter into and continue the dialogue.