Saturday, December 16, 2006

The problem of Self-Evidence

Continuing to read Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968).

"Although, he (Schopenhauer) advises his readers to view the 'self-evident' as a problem, he is unable to question his own conception of the understanding, with its alleged forms and limits. This shows how difficult it is for a philosopher to be aware of his own premises and assumed entities, and how he may fail to see what a later generation comes to see clearly."

Here are a few thoughts provoked by Faber's comment on Schopenhauer:

1. The problem of "self-evidence"
The problem lies in the subjectivity of the observer. It is based on what is evident to me. Since no observer is neutral we need to be aware of the ultimate assumptions we are making that affect our observation and why we have chosen to adopt those assumptions. Adoption is the correct word here because every philosophical position is built on one or more premises which are assumed but cannot be rationally proven. We assume the premises we do, not arbitrarily, but because we believe they are able to make the best sense out of the "facts" at hand.

2. The goal in questioning the "self-evident" is not to rid ourselves of all unproven premises (unless we wish to affirm a radical skepticism). The goal in questioning the "self-evident" is to ensure that we understand what our ultimate premises are, whether what is evident to myself reflects these premises, and whether in the end I am still willing to commit to these premises.

3. Awareness of our premises can be enhanced through some form of distancing. This can occur through the passing of time ("what a later generation comes to see clearly"), through clarifying the motivations that may affect our choice of premises, through the detachment achieved by applying a consistent analytical methodology, etc.

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