Assumptions and Premises in Philosophy

Continuing to read Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968).

"Speculation in philosophy takes the form of hypotheses about the ultimate nature of reality, or the interpretation of existence in terms of one or more basic principles. Finally, the ideal of arranging the body of philosophic knowledge in the form of a deductive system is set up as an ultimate goal. Such a program has the advantage of making clear just what is assumed; and assumptions have been seen to be unavoidable."

This is one of the most important contributions that philosophy makes to every other cognitive enterprise. It reveals that at the bottom of every belief system, including the scientific one, are a set of hypotheses and assumptions that have been adopted in order to have a starting place for constructing the deductive system that derives from these premises. Neither science, nor philosophy, nor religion can construct successful rationalistic proofs for the truth of their foundational assumptions. These assumptions must be taken as a matter of faith in order to proceed with the task of making sense of the world. Faith based assumptions sit at the bottom of every philosophical, scientific, and religious worldview. An examination of these premises is and their implications for our understanding of reality is what constitutes the material for a transcendental critique that reveals the strengths and weaknesses of each system.

O Holy Night

The predicament of absolute authority

Continuing to read Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968).

"In order to be logically acceptable, grounds and evidence must be provided. Every authority may and should be challenged to justify itself, and in justifying itself it must have recourse to other grounds, in the last analysis to evidence. The logically minded person always insists upon proof and evidence; and the mere demand that justification for an alleged absolute authority be given is sufficient to undermine its status as absolute. If the justification is given, the authority becomes relative to the grounds of evidence that may be adduced; and if no justification is given the alleged authority will be rejected. This may be called the predicament of absolute authority."

Here Farber has placed God in a predicament. By means of this word puzzle he has made it impossible for God either to be an absolute authority or, if he is, to be recognized as one. In either case God becomes nicely irrelevant. If the authority justifies itself by presenting evidence it becomes relative to the evidence and is not, therefore, absolute. If the authority refuses to justify itself it will not be recognized and will, therefore, be irrelevant and meaningless.

In this argument against absolute authority, however, an absolute authority is clearly already recognized. The absolute authority that is established here is the individual who has the right to demand proof and evidence of all other authorities and to accept or reject them on the basis of their own evaluation of the evidence. This is where the real predicament of absolute authority lies, the predicament of human autonomy. What do we do with the countless millions of absolute authorities all of whom recognize only themselves as the final authority of what is true or right or just? An expert authority is no threat to human autonomy because it can still be rejected. An absolute authority, however, completely undermines human autonomy. Only the absolute authority of God can give meaning to human rationalizing and enable it to be anything other than arbitrary.

An absolute authority does not have to justify itself in order to be an absolute authority. An absolute authority does have to justify its claim in order to be recognized as an absolute authority. An absolute authority, however, does not have to justify its every action or pronouncement in order to be recognized as a absolute authority. It only has to justify its ultimate claim to authority, once that is demonstrated and accepted everything else is accepted "on authority." God's justification lies in his self-existence and in his position as Creator. He is not dependent on any external facts because no facts are external to him. Every fact relates directly to God and means God.

The problem of Self-Evidence

Continuing to read Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968).

"Although, he (Schopenhauer) advises his readers to view the 'self-evident' as a problem, he is unable to question his own conception of the understanding, with its alleged forms and limits. This shows how difficult it is for a philosopher to be aware of his own premises and assumed entities, and how he may fail to see what a later generation comes to see clearly."

Here are a few thoughts provoked by Faber's comment on Schopenhauer:

1. The problem of "self-evidence"
The problem lies in the subjectivity of the observer. It is based on what is evident to me. Since no observer is neutral we need to be aware of the ultimate assumptions we are making that affect our observation and why we have chosen to adopt those assumptions. Adoption is the correct word here because every philosophical position is built on one or more premises which are assumed but cannot be rationally proven. We assume the premises we do, not arbitrarily, but because we believe they are able to make the best sense out of the "facts" at hand.

2. The goal in questioning the "self-evident" is not to rid ourselves of all unproven premises (unless we wish to affirm a radical skepticism). The goal in questioning the "self-evident" is to ensure that we understand what our ultimate premises are, whether what is evident to myself reflects these premises, and whether in the end I am still willing to commit to these premises.

3. Awareness of our premises can be enhanced through some form of distancing. This can occur through the passing of time ("what a later generation comes to see clearly"), through clarifying the motivations that may affect our choice of premises, through the detachment achieved by applying a consistent analytical methodology, etc.

Lack of Agreement Among Philosophers

I'm reading Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968). In his opening chapter he writes:

"The lack of general agreement among philosophers, whether in different historical periods or at a given time, has been the cause of much criticism. Many of the differences in philosophical views may be attributed to the diversity of motives which lead thinkers to more ultimate speculation or inquiry."

You could replace the word philosophers with almost any branch of study and the statement would make as much sense. People often criticize various disciplines for their abundance of disunity and disagreement and point to this as evidence of the weakness of the discipline. On the contrary it is out of the multitude of views that critical debate arises and progress is made. I believe that this was Paul Feyerabend's point in recognizing and encouraging anarchism in the scientific disciplines. Science (and other disciplines) are weakened when there is too much pressure for conformity to particular theories and viewpoints. Only in a perfect world would perfect conformity be an asset. The key to making the most of our disagreements is to enter into and continue the dialogue.

Richard Kirk on Richard Dawkins

For yet another demolition of Richard Dawkins tirade in "The God Delusion" see what Richard Kirk has to say in The American Spectator.

Plantinga on the Ontological Argument

Plantinga (God and Other Minds) thinks that Anselm's argument is best understood as a reductio ad absurdum and states it like this:

1) God exists in the understanding but not in reality - assumption for reductio
2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone - premise
3) A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality can be conceived - premise
4) A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality is greater than God - from 1) and 2)
5) A being greater than God can be conceived - 3), 4)
6) It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived - by definition of "God"
7) Hence it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality - 1) - 6), reductio ad absurdum

And so if God exists in the understanding, he also exists in reality; but clearly enough he does exist in the understanding (as even the fool will testify); accordingly he exists in reality as well.

Nagel on Dawkins

Thomas Nagel, Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York State University in a review (In The New Republic) of Richard Dawkins latest tirade against religion and faith:

"The reason that we are led to the hypothesis of a designer by considering both the watch and the eye is that these are complex physical structures that carry out a complex function, and we cannot see how they could have come into existence out of unorganized matter purely on the basis of the purposeless laws of physics. For the elements of which they are composed to have come together in just this finely tuned way purely as a result of physical and chemical laws would have been such an improbable fluke that we can regard it in effect as impossible: the hypothesis of chance can be ruled out. But God, whatever he may be, is not a complex physical inhabitant of the natural world. The explanation of his existence as a chance concatenation of atoms is not a possibility for which we must find an alternative, because that is not what anybody means by God. If the God hypothesis makes sense at all, it offers a different kind of explanation from those of physical science: purpose or intention of a mind without a body, capable nevertheless of creating and forming the entire physical world. The point of the hypothesis is to claim that not all explanation is physical, and that there is a mental, purposive, or intentional explanation more fundamental than the basic laws of physics, because it explains even them."

Anselm's Ontological Argument

Here is the classical statement of the Ontological Argument from Anselm's (1033-1109) Proslogion, chapter two:

"And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? . . . But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak - a being than which nothing greater can be conceived - understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.

Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone; then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality."

Now, don't anyone post a comment saying: "I can conceive of a Santa Claus, now a real Santa Claus is greater than an imagined Santa Claus, therefore Santa Claus must exist." This is not Anselm's argument even though I have seen people dismiss the argument with a similar statement. Anyone who reads the argument like this will surely NOT get a visit from Santa this year! Bear in mind that this argument has attracted the attention of many other philosophers who have presented their own version of it, including Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Hartshorne, Malcolm, Godel, and Plantinga.

The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

I intend to post here from time to time some discussion of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. I'm not particularly interested in this as an apologetic as it has been particularly unfruitful in this regard. For a number of years now I've had an interest in exploring the history of the argument and in pursuing the things that can be learned by studying it. Briefly, here is why I have been so fascinated by this argument:

1) It claims to be a rational proof for the existence of God
2) Its simplicity of statement but complexity of argument
3) The fact that every major philosopher has had something to say about it
4) The fact that it appears to be obviously flawed but has resisted a definitive rebuttal for a thousand years
5) It is an abstract word puzzle that resents a fascinating challenge to the logician.
6) It involves all kinds of interesting questions including the nature of existential propositions, the relationship between being and nonbeing, the nature of ideas and reality, etc.

The first statement of the argument was made by Anselm (1033-1109) and I will post that next.

Plantinga on The Problem of Evil

I'm continuing to read in Plantinga's "God and Other Minds" and found the chapter on the problem of evil interesting. Since this is probably the most frequently sited apologetic challenge I thought I would summarize his argument here.

The challenge: The existence of evil and the belief in an omnipotent and perfect God are contradictory beliefs. Plantinga suggests that this can be set forth in five propositions essential to traditional theism, with respect to the problem:

a) that God exists
b) that God is omnipotent
c) that God is omniscient
d) that God is wholly good
e) that evil exists

There is no formal contradiction in these five propositions. Some other proposition must be added to this to produce the contradiction. Such a proposition must be:

i) necessarily true

and/or

ii) an essential part of theism

or

iii) a logical consequence of such propositions

Finding an additional proposition that accomplishes the purpose intended has proven to be very elusive (Plantinga surveys the field of suggestions).

Now an omnipotent God is able to eliminate every case of evil and a perfectly good God would want to do so. Plantinga suggests that a proviso should be added to this: this is the case if, and only if, it does not require him to eliminate a greater good in order to do so.

This proviso throws a wrench into the atheological argument from evil. (Consider if Job's suffering produced a state of affairs which is a greater good than would have been the case if the evil had been prevented. The answer to this is at least arguable in the affirmative.)

The atheologian must now prove that unjustified evil exists. That is, "there is at least one evil state of affairs such that for every good that entails it, there is a greater good that does not."

The atheist must show that it is logically impossible that there is evil and that all of it is justified. In other words, "If there is any evil in the world, then there is unjustified evil" must be shown to be a necessarily true proposition. Very difficult to do.

Verifiability criterion of meaning

Reading Alvin Plantinga: "God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God"

In this book Plantinga has a chapter entitled "Verificationism and Other Atheologica". I found it interesting because it is still quite common to hear people trying to end debate on one thing or another by saying "it can't be verified by empirical evidence" or "this statement has no meaning because it cannot be falsified."

Plantinga looks particularly at Anthony Flew's discussion about verification and makes some interesting responses to this debate:

"It appears, then, that according to Flew a meaningful (contingent) proposition must be falsifiable by observation statements; there must be some finite and consistent set of observation statements that entail its denial."

This is the Verifiability Criterion of Meaning and it assumes that only empiricism can provide a valid philosophy of truth. But Plantinga points out that the history of the attempts to clearly define a verifiability criteria show that it has failed to demonstrate any effective use as a tool for evaluating truth and meaning.

"The fact is that no one has succeeded in stating a version of the verifiability criterion that is even remotely plausible; and by now the project is beginning to look unhopeful."

To suggest that religious statements are or are not verifiable is an empty challenge when no fruitful verifiability criterion for the truth of anything can be put forward. The only possible way of stating a verifiability criterion that might be of some use would be to establish the criterion by fiat: "the statements of science and 'common sense' are meaningful, all others are not." This effectively is what many scientists and philosophers have tried to do.

It cannot be demonstrated that a statement or proposition that cannot be falsified is not meaningful or true. "Unconditional love exists" can neither be verified nor falsified, yet it is still a meaningful statement and is still arguably true.