Assumptions and Premises in Philosophy

Continuing to read Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968).

"Speculation in philosophy takes the form of hypotheses about the ultimate nature of reality, or the interpretation of existence in terms of one or more basic principles. Finally, the ideal of arranging the body of philosophic knowledge in the form of a deductive system is set up as an ultimate goal. Such a program has the advantage of making clear just what is assumed; and assumptions have been seen to be unavoidable."

This is one of the most important contributions that philosophy makes to every other cognitive enterprise. It reveals that at the bottom of every belief system, including the scientific one, are a set of hypotheses and assumptions that have been adopted in order to have a starting place for constructing the deductive system that derives from these premises. Neither science, nor philosophy, nor religion can construct successful rationalistic proofs for the truth of their foundational assumptions. These assumptions must be taken as a matter of faith in order to proceed with the task of making sense of the world. Faith based assumptions sit at the bottom of every philosophical, scientific, and religious worldview. An examination of these premises is and their implications for our understanding of reality is what constitutes the material for a transcendental critique that reveals the strengths and weaknesses of each system.

O Holy Night

The predicament of absolute authority

Continuing to read Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968).

"In order to be logically acceptable, grounds and evidence must be provided. Every authority may and should be challenged to justify itself, and in justifying itself it must have recourse to other grounds, in the last analysis to evidence. The logically minded person always insists upon proof and evidence; and the mere demand that justification for an alleged absolute authority be given is sufficient to undermine its status as absolute. If the justification is given, the authority becomes relative to the grounds of evidence that may be adduced; and if no justification is given the alleged authority will be rejected. This may be called the predicament of absolute authority."

Here Farber has placed God in a predicament. By means of this word puzzle he has made it impossible for God either to be an absolute authority or, if he is, to be recognized as one. In either case God becomes nicely irrelevant. If the authority justifies itself by presenting evidence it becomes relative to the evidence and is not, therefore, absolute. If the authority refuses to justify itself it will not be recognized and will, therefore, be irrelevant and meaningless.

In this argument against absolute authority, however, an absolute authority is clearly already recognized. The absolute authority that is established here is the individual who has the right to demand proof and evidence of all other authorities and to accept or reject them on the basis of their own evaluation of the evidence. This is where the real predicament of absolute authority lies, the predicament of human autonomy. What do we do with the countless millions of absolute authorities all of whom recognize only themselves as the final authority of what is true or right or just? An expert authority is no threat to human autonomy because it can still be rejected. An absolute authority, however, completely undermines human autonomy. Only the absolute authority of God can give meaning to human rationalizing and enable it to be anything other than arbitrary.

An absolute authority does not have to justify itself in order to be an absolute authority. An absolute authority does have to justify its claim in order to be recognized as an absolute authority. An absolute authority, however, does not have to justify its every action or pronouncement in order to be recognized as a absolute authority. It only has to justify its ultimate claim to authority, once that is demonstrated and accepted everything else is accepted "on authority." God's justification lies in his self-existence and in his position as Creator. He is not dependent on any external facts because no facts are external to him. Every fact relates directly to God and means God.

The problem of Self-Evidence

Continuing to read Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968).

"Although, he (Schopenhauer) advises his readers to view the 'self-evident' as a problem, he is unable to question his own conception of the understanding, with its alleged forms and limits. This shows how difficult it is for a philosopher to be aware of his own premises and assumed entities, and how he may fail to see what a later generation comes to see clearly."

Here are a few thoughts provoked by Faber's comment on Schopenhauer:

1. The problem of "self-evidence"
The problem lies in the subjectivity of the observer. It is based on what is evident to me. Since no observer is neutral we need to be aware of the ultimate assumptions we are making that affect our observation and why we have chosen to adopt those assumptions. Adoption is the correct word here because every philosophical position is built on one or more premises which are assumed but cannot be rationally proven. We assume the premises we do, not arbitrarily, but because we believe they are able to make the best sense out of the "facts" at hand.

2. The goal in questioning the "self-evident" is not to rid ourselves of all unproven premises (unless we wish to affirm a radical skepticism). The goal in questioning the "self-evident" is to ensure that we understand what our ultimate premises are, whether what is evident to myself reflects these premises, and whether in the end I am still willing to commit to these premises.

3. Awareness of our premises can be enhanced through some form of distancing. This can occur through the passing of time ("what a later generation comes to see clearly"), through clarifying the motivations that may affect our choice of premises, through the detachment achieved by applying a consistent analytical methodology, etc.

Lack of Agreement Among Philosophers

I'm reading Marvin Farber's (1901-1980) book "Basic Issues of Philosophy: Experience, Reality, and Human Values" (Harper Torchbooks, 1968). In his opening chapter he writes:

"The lack of general agreement among philosophers, whether in different historical periods or at a given time, has been the cause of much criticism. Many of the differences in philosophical views may be attributed to the diversity of motives which lead thinkers to more ultimate speculation or inquiry."

You could replace the word philosophers with almost any branch of study and the statement would make as much sense. People often criticize various disciplines for their abundance of disunity and disagreement and point to this as evidence of the weakness of the discipline. On the contrary it is out of the multitude of views that critical debate arises and progress is made. I believe that this was Paul Feyerabend's point in recognizing and encouraging anarchism in the scientific disciplines. Science (and other disciplines) are weakened when there is too much pressure for conformity to particular theories and viewpoints. Only in a perfect world would perfect conformity be an asset. The key to making the most of our disagreements is to enter into and continue the dialogue.

Richard Kirk on Richard Dawkins

For yet another demolition of Richard Dawkins tirade in "The God Delusion" see what Richard Kirk has to say in The American Spectator.

Plantinga on the Ontological Argument

Plantinga (God and Other Minds) thinks that Anselm's argument is best understood as a reductio ad absurdum and states it like this:

1) God exists in the understanding but not in reality - assumption for reductio
2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone - premise
3) A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality can be conceived - premise
4) A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality is greater than God - from 1) and 2)
5) A being greater than God can be conceived - 3), 4)
6) It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived - by definition of "God"
7) Hence it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality - 1) - 6), reductio ad absurdum

And so if God exists in the understanding, he also exists in reality; but clearly enough he does exist in the understanding (as even the fool will testify); accordingly he exists in reality as well.

Nagel on Dawkins

Thomas Nagel, Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York State University in a review (In The New Republic) of Richard Dawkins latest tirade against religion and faith:

"The reason that we are led to the hypothesis of a designer by considering both the watch and the eye is that these are complex physical structures that carry out a complex function, and we cannot see how they could have come into existence out of unorganized matter purely on the basis of the purposeless laws of physics. For the elements of which they are composed to have come together in just this finely tuned way purely as a result of physical and chemical laws would have been such an improbable fluke that we can regard it in effect as impossible: the hypothesis of chance can be ruled out. But God, whatever he may be, is not a complex physical inhabitant of the natural world. The explanation of his existence as a chance concatenation of atoms is not a possibility for which we must find an alternative, because that is not what anybody means by God. If the God hypothesis makes sense at all, it offers a different kind of explanation from those of physical science: purpose or intention of a mind without a body, capable nevertheless of creating and forming the entire physical world. The point of the hypothesis is to claim that not all explanation is physical, and that there is a mental, purposive, or intentional explanation more fundamental than the basic laws of physics, because it explains even them."

Anselm's Ontological Argument

Here is the classical statement of the Ontological Argument from Anselm's (1033-1109) Proslogion, chapter two:

"And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? . . . But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak - a being than which nothing greater can be conceived - understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.

Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone; then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality."

Now, don't anyone post a comment saying: "I can conceive of a Santa Claus, now a real Santa Claus is greater than an imagined Santa Claus, therefore Santa Claus must exist." This is not Anselm's argument even though I have seen people dismiss the argument with a similar statement. Anyone who reads the argument like this will surely NOT get a visit from Santa this year! Bear in mind that this argument has attracted the attention of many other philosophers who have presented their own version of it, including Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Hartshorne, Malcolm, Godel, and Plantinga.

The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

I intend to post here from time to time some discussion of the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. I'm not particularly interested in this as an apologetic as it has been particularly unfruitful in this regard. For a number of years now I've had an interest in exploring the history of the argument and in pursuing the things that can be learned by studying it. Briefly, here is why I have been so fascinated by this argument:

1) It claims to be a rational proof for the existence of God
2) Its simplicity of statement but complexity of argument
3) The fact that every major philosopher has had something to say about it
4) The fact that it appears to be obviously flawed but has resisted a definitive rebuttal for a thousand years
5) It is an abstract word puzzle that resents a fascinating challenge to the logician.
6) It involves all kinds of interesting questions including the nature of existential propositions, the relationship between being and nonbeing, the nature of ideas and reality, etc.

The first statement of the argument was made by Anselm (1033-1109) and I will post that next.

Plantinga on The Problem of Evil

I'm continuing to read in Plantinga's "God and Other Minds" and found the chapter on the problem of evil interesting. Since this is probably the most frequently sited apologetic challenge I thought I would summarize his argument here.

The challenge: The existence of evil and the belief in an omnipotent and perfect God are contradictory beliefs. Plantinga suggests that this can be set forth in five propositions essential to traditional theism, with respect to the problem:

a) that God exists
b) that God is omnipotent
c) that God is omniscient
d) that God is wholly good
e) that evil exists

There is no formal contradiction in these five propositions. Some other proposition must be added to this to produce the contradiction. Such a proposition must be:

i) necessarily true

and/or

ii) an essential part of theism

or

iii) a logical consequence of such propositions

Finding an additional proposition that accomplishes the purpose intended has proven to be very elusive (Plantinga surveys the field of suggestions).

Now an omnipotent God is able to eliminate every case of evil and a perfectly good God would want to do so. Plantinga suggests that a proviso should be added to this: this is the case if, and only if, it does not require him to eliminate a greater good in order to do so.

This proviso throws a wrench into the atheological argument from evil. (Consider if Job's suffering produced a state of affairs which is a greater good than would have been the case if the evil had been prevented. The answer to this is at least arguable in the affirmative.)

The atheologian must now prove that unjustified evil exists. That is, "there is at least one evil state of affairs such that for every good that entails it, there is a greater good that does not."

The atheist must show that it is logically impossible that there is evil and that all of it is justified. In other words, "If there is any evil in the world, then there is unjustified evil" must be shown to be a necessarily true proposition. Very difficult to do.

Verifiability criterion of meaning

Reading Alvin Plantinga: "God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God"

In this book Plantinga has a chapter entitled "Verificationism and Other Atheologica". I found it interesting because it is still quite common to hear people trying to end debate on one thing or another by saying "it can't be verified by empirical evidence" or "this statement has no meaning because it cannot be falsified."

Plantinga looks particularly at Anthony Flew's discussion about verification and makes some interesting responses to this debate:

"It appears, then, that according to Flew a meaningful (contingent) proposition must be falsifiable by observation statements; there must be some finite and consistent set of observation statements that entail its denial."

This is the Verifiability Criterion of Meaning and it assumes that only empiricism can provide a valid philosophy of truth. But Plantinga points out that the history of the attempts to clearly define a verifiability criteria show that it has failed to demonstrate any effective use as a tool for evaluating truth and meaning.

"The fact is that no one has succeeded in stating a version of the verifiability criterion that is even remotely plausible; and by now the project is beginning to look unhopeful."

To suggest that religious statements are or are not verifiable is an empty challenge when no fruitful verifiability criterion for the truth of anything can be put forward. The only possible way of stating a verifiability criterion that might be of some use would be to establish the criterion by fiat: "the statements of science and 'common sense' are meaningful, all others are not." This effectively is what many scientists and philosophers have tried to do.

It cannot be demonstrated that a statement or proposition that cannot be falsified is not meaningful or true. "Unconditional love exists" can neither be verified nor falsified, yet it is still a meaningful statement and is still arguably true.

"Redeeming Science"

Vern Poythress, one of my professors from my years at Westminster, has published a new book entitled "Redeeming Science." Poythress has a PhD. in Mathematics from Harvard and a PhD in theolgy from Stellenbosch. This is a very interesting book and the best part is that it can be read in its entirety on the internet for free at this link: http://www.frame-poythress.org/ (The writings of Vern Poythress and John Frame are made available at no charge on this page.)

Stephen Meyer, the Director of the Centre for Science and Culture at the Discovery Institute says this about the book:

“Poythress shows how a proper understanding of biblical theology makes possible not just one but many credible harmonizations of biblical and scientific truth. Along the way, he provides an insightful defense of the theory of intelligent design as a viable scientific research program. His examination of the mathematical beauty inherent in the universe gives yet another compelling reason to acknowledge the wisdom and design that lie behind physical reality.”

Chapter 19 of the books deals specifically with the Intelligent Design issue.

History as Art

(With Implications for Biblical Studies: Some thoughts provoked by reflecting on Paul Ricoeur's Narrative Philosophy)

Modern historiography is presented as a purely rational, descriptive, science. Historians who correctly use the methods and tools will produce an accurate view of history that is capable of consensus throughout the profession. The goal in writing history is not creativity or novelty but accuracy and as exact a representation or reproduction of what actually happened as is reasonably possible. This view of history writing belongs in the pantheon of twentieth century mythology.

History writing is in fact an art form that is creative of understanding and interpretation. Far from simply "telling what happened" we are developing stories that enable ust ot define ourselves out of the raw material of the past. History is the canvas on which we prepare our self-portraits. History is created as we write, not simply revealed as we research.

The historian uses more of the tools of the artist than of the photographer. To reproduce an exact likeness of the past would require something that is technically impossible. It is not possible to reiterate everything that happened in a given era or period of time and to show the exact relationship of every event to every other and to assess every consequence of these interrelated events. If it were possible to achieve this, in fact, nothing would have been achieved other than a meaningless flashback. Instead, the historian takes up the tools of the artist. He compartmentalizes (sections off a piece of landscape or period of time), he enhances (paints large those things that seem most significant), he diminishes (fades out or eliminates vast amounts of material that don't contribute to the meaning), she shades (gives depth to certain things), groups isolated events together to create patterns, names events to give meaning and interpretation, colours to show continuity or discontinuity. Paul Ricouer speaks of plot as the soul of narrative which invents an ordered and intelligible whole out of a diversity of incidents and actions. History can never be a simple chronology of "facts." This is because history involves not only chronology but simultanaety (a huge number of disparate events occuring at the same time), and space (events occuring in different locations). It is the creation of the plots that brings history into existence.

Modern historiography may charge the Old Testament writing with terribly misrepresenting the facts. To read the Old Testament one would think that the nation of Israel was the central figure in the ancient near Eastern world when in fact it was only a bit player dwarfed by great and powerful nation states. Israel's history therefore is misleading and inaccurate if not self-centered. So much for the credibility of the Bible. Once this conclusion is reached the Bible can be relegated to a source for pithy sayings or insights helpful in our pursuit of a meaningful spirituality.

Not so fast! The same artistic tools that modern historians employ in order to create our history are being employed by the Biblical writers. For now we can leave aside the issue of Revelation since we are concerned about the human contribution and process in all of this. When the Biblical writers begin to paint on the canvas of history they discovered that some things that seemed so big at the time simply fade into the background and some things that seemed of little consequence are central to the plot. God, who was largely irrelevant to the great nations that overshadowed Israel, begins to emerge from the canvas of history as the painting progresses. The question is not one of whose history is most scientific and accurate but who has best grasped the plot and so written the most meaningful story.

Modern history creates plot all the time. Think of how we take the events that we have some record of and shape them into a statement of meaning or interpretation that ultimately defines who we are. How justified are we in giving names like "the Dark Ages," "the Rennaisance," "the French Revolution," etc. ? Are these the only possible names that could be applied to these periods? Are they even the best names that could be applied? What happens to history when we take what is a continuous flow of events occuring all over the world both simultaneously and chronologically and divide it up into clearly defined times and named events? Are we not involved in creating plot and interpretation?

Scientific Objectivity

Here are a couple more quotes from Anthony Thiselton's "New Horizons in Hermeneutics" with respect to scientific objectivity. These quotes are with reference to some ideas of Heidegger and Gadamer.

"For Heidegger, what is 'objective,' including making assertions about 'facts,' is derivative from, and dependent on, hermeneutical understanding from within a given horizon. The fact-stating language of the sciences has its place, but only at a merely technical or instrumental level."
(P. 319)

Re Gadamer's thought:

"The physical sciences appear to operate on an empirical, rational, or observational basis, but in actuality these are presuppositions in 'possibilities of knowing' which are left 'half in the dark.' For example, the science of statistics seems to be an exact observational and mathematical discipline based only on 'the facts.' But 'which questions these facts answer, and which facts would begin to speak if other questions were asked, are hermeneutical questions.' Much depends in research in the sciences on 'noticing the interesting fact,' or the use of imagination, and on the posing of the right question...' Hermeneutics concerns all human enquiry."
(P. 322)

Within its own world science is, for the mostpart, rational, objective, observational and based on 'the facts.' This is both a true and a superficial observation. A scientist's claim to objectivity does not amount to as much as he may think it does. It is not all that difficult to create a philosophical space for your work and then to remain consistent and objective within it. Every worldview, including the scientific one, does this. What many scientists have difficulty recognizing is that the foundation of their discipline is philosophically based. The objectivity of science does not extend beyond that philosophical commitment and cannot. Science may be founded on any number of philosophical (or religious) foundations and maintain within itself the same objectivity and commitment to 'the facts.' The doing of science and the founding of science are two very distinct enterprises and must each be carefully respected as such. Science itself is not a worldview but it is never practiced independently of a worldview. This is what Heidegger and Gadamer are seeking to point out.

Talking to the enemy

"If you want to make peace, you don't talk to your friends. You talk to your enemies." (Moshe Dayan)

While it is not always possible to talk to your enemy, the fact remains that much precious time is lost in the peace process by delaying the dialogue. The context of the above quote is a matter of international peace but I continue to explore the more mundane matter of dialogue between disparate parties with repect to issues of intellectual disagreement. This is a world of learning, insight, and understanding that inhabits the space of reasonable, respectful, and thoughtful dialogue between highly polarized positions. This fruitfulness awaits our willingness to release the desire to quickly dismiss, debunk, or demolish the enemy position.

If the above quote is true why do we not talk to our enemies? Some reasons immediately suggest themselves:

1. We believe that we are in a position to live without peace. The level of conflict is tolerable without any incentive to listen or compromise.
2. We blindly hate the enemy. Our history as enemies has created a great chasm or pronounced polarization. There is a deep inertia to hate that requires powerful motives to overcome.
3. We don't negotiate with________ (fill in the blank: terrorists, fundamentalists, liberals, conservatives, religious wingnuts, atheists, heretics...).
4. Dialogue is seen as a softening of our position. If I talk with my enemy I am already agreeing that my position isn't strong enough to stand alone in opposition to all other possible positions.
5. Talking to an enemy is seen as a sign of weakness. If I really believe in my position my enemy can go to hell.

Of course there is considerable mythology in the above reasons for avoiding dialogue and all the fruitfulness of discussion is delayed until something pushes us into a more hopeful relationship.

What elements might be necessary for talking to enemies?

1. Forgiveness. The enemy is dangerous and has done us much harm. We have a history that we cannot get past. Forgiveness is the only way past this history. There is no fruitful dialogue without at least one side extending forgiveness.
2. Listening. We have to be willing to hear that some of the argument and rationale of the enemy may be well founded.
3. Recognition of common ground. It helps the discussion considerably to affirm what both sides hold in common.
4. Find the "reasonable" people on each side, with whom the dialogue can begin.
5. Lose the rhetoric. In effect, disarm or at least declare a ceasefire.
6. Understand the non-negotiables on both sides. This keeps the discussion realistic.
7. Encourage hope for the possibility of a positive outcome, even if it is only a generous "agree to disagree."
8. See that your own position will likely be enriched through dialogue. Your strengths will be made stronger and you will have an opportunity to identify and minimize, or even eliminate, some of your weaknesses.
9. Recognize that "peace" and "agreement" are not necessarily the same thing.

Faith and Reason

This post is a synopsis of some of the ideas presented by Rodney Stark, professor of Sociology at Baylor University, in an article run in the National Post on Friday, January 27, 2006. An expanded version of the article first appeared in The Chronicle of Higher Education and is based on a book by Stark: "The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism and Western Success", Random House, publisher.

The article interested me in light of claims by a few prominent scientists, notably Richard Dawkins, that faith and reason in general, and faith and science in particular, are in conflict.

Here is my synopsis of some of the relevant points:

1. Christianity alone, amongst the world religions, "embraced reason and logic as the primary guides to religious truth," as opposed to a general emphasis on mystery and intuition.

2. The Church Father's taught that "reason was the supreme gift from God and the means to progressively increase understanding of Scripture and revelation."

3. This led to the creation, by the Church, of the medieval university which stimulated "the pursuit of science and the evolution of democratic theory."

4. "The success of the West, including the rise of science, rested entirely on religious foundations, and the people who brought it about were devout Christians."

5. Max Weber, 20th Century German sociologist, concluded that "only Protestantism provided a moral vision that led people to restrain their material consumption while vigorously seeking wealth."

6. Belgian scholar Henri Pirenne demonstrated that all of the essential features of capitalism are to be found from the 12th Century on.

7. Only where reason and freedom arose together was significant progress made. "Before any medieval European state actually attempted to rule by an elected council, Christian theologians had long been theorizing about the nature of equality and individual rights."

8. "From the earliest days, the major theologians taught that faith in reason was intrinsic to faith in God." (Tertullian, a second Century theologian, for example)

9. It was during the "so-called" Dark Ages "that European technology and science overtook and surpassed the rest of the world...by the 10th Century Europe already was far ahead" with respect to farming, water and wind power, and military advances.

10. "...by the seventh Century, Christianity had become the only major world religion to formulate specific theological opposition to slavery, and by no later than the 11th Century, the Church had expelled the dreadful institution from Europe."

"The common denominator in all these great historical developments was the Christian commitment to reason. That was why the West won."

"Evidentialism, Reformed Epistemology and the Holy Spirit"

Some reflections on the above titled paper by John M. DePoe, Western Michigan University:

A non-philosopher tries to make sense of a philosophical discussion:

1. DePoe notes that Evidentialism is criticized "for allegedly eliminating the possibility for justified belief in God among the unlettered faithful" who fail to acquire sufficient rational reasons for belief (P1):

By this understanding of justified belief no mathematician would have a justified belief in the theorems of mathematics who had not reproven all of those theorems for himself. This would leave most of us with no more than a handful, at best, of justified beliefs about anything. Is this definition of justified belief worth anything to anyone? In our normal daily living what we are usually working with are not "justified" beliefs but "justifiable" beliefs. This discussion about justification seems to take too personal a view of belief. What if we look at justified beliefs as community property rather than the property of an individual. Does the community have a justified belief, x, which is supported by the collective thinking of the community? If so, why can the theoretical fourteen year old in question not be seen to share a "justified" belief with his community? Justified beliefs are not necessarily true but the youth can have sound reasons for standing with the community. The question for Evidentialism is not whether some individual has acquired sufficient reasons for a justified belief but whether empirical evidence is at all capable of justifying belief in God.

2. DePoe finds two key epistemic roles for the Holy Spirit from his review of Scripture: "providing testimony to the truth of Christianity and conferring confidence to believers."

DePoe presents these roles as a way forward in strengthening the Evidentialist's case by using it to shore up the evidence and to act as evidence themselves. I agree that the Holy Spirit acts to reinforce the impact of the evidence but not that this action of the Holy Spirit is itself evidence. How would it be possible to assess or count as evidence the fact that I feel convinced or I feel certain about my beliefs?

"No matter what a believer’s educational background and philosophical expertise are, all believers’ evidential support for belief in God will include at least one piece of evidence—the testimony of the Holy Spirit." (P6)

How can this testimony be counted or evaluated as evidence? Is it the fact that a person believes without evidence, or believes with weak evidence, or believes in the face of evidence to the contrary? It would seem that it would be only under such conditions that this "testimony" would show itself. In which case it would raise the question of either a slide into irrationality or into fideism, both of which DePoe is concerned to avoid.

3. I find the following statement theologically disconcerting:

"At first blush, it seems that taking this second work of the Holy Spirit seriously
commits one to fideism. If the Holy Spirit’s testimony is construed in such a way that it
always swamps the opposing evidence for belief in God, the rest of the evidence seems
irrelevant. Moreover, assigning an indefinitely large evidential value to the testimony of
the Holy Spirit would make Christians “undefeatable”—a position non-believers find
frustrating (at best) or intellectually dishonest (at worst). Finally, this evidence may seem
unfair since it is “private.” Unbelievers will hardly be impressed by alleged evidence to
which they have no access." (P6)

DePoe does not want to find himself in a position where the Holy Spirit's testimony can "swamp the opposing evidence" or "make Christians 'undefeatable'" or "frustrate non-believers" or appear "intellectually dishonest" etc. I don't know how this position is avoidable for the Christian. The Christian position on divine testimony cannot be that "the heavens declare the possibility of the glory of God and the firmament might, under some readings, show his handiwork" (Psalm 19). There can be no way around saying to the non-believer that "what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them" (Romans 1:19 - see Paul's whole discussion in this chapter). I don't think we have any choice but to root belief in Revelation. The task of the apologist is to show that the position this puts us in is reasonable and makes sense on the empirical evidence that we have. In turn we attempt to show that their own position, based on their own premises, is not justifiable.

With respect to the charge that we are appealing to "private" evidence my response is that the Scriptures declare this to be public evidence to the whole earth. I can be confident that this message has been sent to everyone, even to those who deny receiving it. We cannot ignore the fact that the Bible deals with unbelief as a moral problem rather than as an intellectual one.

James Agee, Novelist

"All that each person is, and experiences, and shall ever experience, in body and mind, all these things are differing expressions of himself and of one root, and are identical: and not one of these things nor one of these persons is ever quite to be duplicated, nor replaced, nor has it ever quite had prededent: but each is a new and incommunicably tender life, wounded in every breath and almost as hardly killed as easily wounded: sustaining, for a while, without defense, the enormous assaults of the universe."
(Quoted by Philip Yancey in "Soul Survivor")

Pause to reflect upon yourself, and upon the person next to you in the universe; Pause to reflect upon the victims of poverty, abuse, neglect, prejudice; Pause to reflect upon the sick, the dying, the mentally ill, the suicide. Pick any one individual out of this mass. Pick yourself or some stranger to you and see this person as one who is "never quite to be duplicated, nor replaced." Pick even your enemy or the enemy of your friend and see him or her in these terms. Can we treat with more care, respect, and awe the one who is "wounded in every breath?" Can we wonder at the fact that we are "as hardly killed as easily wounded?" Can we marvel at how the starving, impoverished, abandoned child, of some African nation can "sustain, for a while, without defense, the enormous assaults of the universe?" Biology is the least of our concerns in trying to explain the wonder and origin of the human spirit.

Religion the root of all evil

Oxford Professor, Richard Dawkins, has produced a two-part television program in which he attempts to demonstrate that religion is the root of all evil. This is an old argument and I haven't seen the series but just a few observations on the basic argument itself:

1. The use of the term "evil" in a naturalistic, Darwinian, argument seems out of place. If a dragonfly kills and eats a mosquito is the dragonfly evil? If a weasel kills a whole hen house full of chickens and leaves them to die in their own blood is the weasel evil? If a lion kills and eats a man is the lion evil? If a man kills another man is the man evil? At what point in the food chain does killing become evil? What place do moral judgments have in a purely naturalistic world? Is the evolutionary process of struggle and survival a moral process? Does Dawkins reserve the moral argument for homo sapiens alone? What dramatic change has taken place in the history of evolution that suddenly the whole story has taken on deeply moral tones? Is it possible that even the evolutionists cannot live with the logic of a purely naturalistic world? If humans are simply fancy containers for genes, as Dawkins believes, then how can any moral judgments be made against anyone?

2. The phrase "religion is the root of all evil" can be defended using the same methodology that Dawkins uses by substituting for the word "religion" any ideology, culture, or subculture that you wish to insert, including science. It would not be difficult to insert "atheism" in the place of religion and come up with a compelling argument in support of the case. The most "successful" application of Marxist ideology has been communism. With its intention to eliminate all forms of religion and to eliminate all of its ideological opponents this form of atheism has been responsible for the deaths of between 85 and 100 million people worldwide. What Dawkins fails to see is that it is people (theologically speaking, sin) that are the root of all evil, if it is possible to believe in evil at all in a naturalistic universe. Evil people will use any tool to promote their evil including religion, science, marxism, etc.

3. I can take the phrase "religion is the root of all evil" and test its veracity in terms of my own life. I can certainly say that I have committed evils in my live, and continue to do so. As a Christian I have been continually confronted by my own evil through my reading of the Bible. The Sermon on the Mount alone provides a powerful counterforce against the inclinations of the human heart. In my own case religion has acted as a restraint on evil and has presented a challenge to me to live in love, mercy, and forgiveness, even towards those that I might be inclined to view as my enemies. Have I ever used my religion as an excuse to do evil? Yes. But this does not make religion the root of my evil. It only shows how the human heart is inclined to take even the good and use it for evil. Although religion might present me with yet another tool with which to do harm it is also the most powerful tool I have for confronting and overcoming the evil that is in me. Beyond that it is a wellspring of grace and mercy and forgiveness that gives me the freedom to pursue the life of the gospel.

Martin Luther King, Jr. Day

Martin Luther King, Jr, From The Call of Service, (Quoted by Philip Yancey in Soul Survivor, P. 106-107):

“A big danger for us is the temptation to follow the people we are opposing. They call us names, so we call them names…but I remind you that in many people, in many people called segregationists, there are other things going on in their lives: this person or that person, standing here or there may also be other things – kind to neighbors and family, helpful and good-spirited at work.

You all know, I think, what I’m trying to say – that we must try not to end up with stereotypes of those we oppose, even as they slip all of us into their stereotypes. And who are we? Let us not do to ourselves as others (as our opponents) do to us: try to put ourselves into one all-inclusive category – the virtuous ones as against the evil ones, or the well-educated as against the ignorant. You can see that I can go on and on – and there is the danger: the “us” or “them” mentality takes hold, and we do, actually, begin to run the risk of joining ranks with the very people we are opposing. I worry about this a lot these days.”

On the one hand this is a hugely generous attitude on the part of someone who has been physically and verbally attacked to the degree that Luther and many of his followers were. On the other hand Luther understands that the very real danger exists of becoming the enemy we hate.

Even in more ordinary circumstances there is a huge application of this principle to the people we interact with all day long. Take note of how many times throughout the day you see people but don't really see them because you trivialize them by categorizing them. These people become invisible to us because we know them by only one fact - how they relate to us in a given context. They are "that kind of customer," or "this kind of driver." They are "a religious person," "an atheist," a "conservative," "a liberal," and so on. We know nothing of these people (and they know nothing of us). In reality they are not anything like our charicature of them. Each one has his own story. A person is religious for a lot of reasons, or an atheist for a lot of reasons, or a conservative, or a liberal, or a criminal, or an addict, for a lot of reasons. As soon as we fit them with a label we dehumanize them, we rob them of their story, of the history of their relationships, their successes and failures, their endearing qualities and their secrets. They become invisible and can be eliminated. They can be demeaned, ignored, even beaten, alienated, and discarded. Follow any of the debates going on in the blogs or various internet venues and see if this is not happening unceasingly among intelligent, educated people today. The most frequent argument used in any debate is the ad hominem argument. Martin Luther King, Jr., still has a lot to teach us today.

"doctrines seen as facts"

I'm continuing to explore the reasons why, in certain debates, people holding different positions cannot give up the view that their opponent can only be dishonest, ignorant, or irrational. Certainly there are dishonest, ignorant, and irrational people out there but there is something more to this dynamic than this assessment suggests. Here are some ideas I came across in reading Anthony Thiselton's Two Horizons. Thiselton is discussing some ideas by G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty):

"Cultural presuppositions, Hulme declares, become so much a part of the mind of the people of the given culture 'and lie so far back, that they are never really conscious of them. They do not see them, but other things through them.' They constitute 'doctrines seen as facts.' In due course we shall compare the idea of cultural presuppositions with some of Wittgenstein's observations in his last writing On Certainty, on what G.E. Moore had regarded as certainties of 'common sense.' They are certainties, Wittgenstein argues, in the sense that they are like hinges on which all our every day presuppositions turn. They perform a logical role not unlike that of the theological assertion 'it is written.' Such a proposition, Wittgenstein explains, 'gives our way of looking at things...their form...'" (P.74)

"They articulate 'the scaffolding of our thoughts'." (P 392)

"Within certain communities they have become virtually unquestioned or even unquestionable axioms; they function 'as a foundation for research and action,' but are often simply 'isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule.' Wittgenstein seems to suggest that in any culture, including our own, 'all enquiry...is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt...They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry.' In due course, an axiom may become 'fossilized.' It is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted onto an unused siding.' But it does not thereby lose its significance; rather, its significance has changed into that of a grammatical proposition. 'Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.'" (P392-393)

"Thus, as in the case of ordinary grammatical statements, if someone challenges an unshakable 'hinge' proposition from within the community or culture in question. 'I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.' 'What counts as a test?' The decisive point is that 'our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings.'" (P. 393)

"Wittgenstein remarks that one thinks one is looking at the nature of something, but 'one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.' It is in this context, and in this sense, that he observes, 'The problems are solved not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.'" (P. 404)

"The picture and the grammar which it suggests 'commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.' It is only by breaking the spell of a misleading picture that Wittgenstein can 'show the fly the way out of the bottle.'" (P. 404)

"More recently, special attention has been given to the far-reaching role of paradigms in the sciences, especially by Thomas S. Kuhn. Kuhn argues, for example, that the men who called Copernicus mad because he claimed that the earth moved were not 'just wrong.' The point was that 'part of what they mean by 'earth' was fixed position.' If 'earth' was a pardigm-case of fixity, Copernicus seemed to be making a self-contradictory claim. Only by changing their way of looking at things, and substituting a new paradigm, could the way be opened for an acceptance of his claims." (P. 405)

Our opponent can seem to be making a simple grammatical error, a basic blunder of logic, because our picture of reality and our language used to describe it already settles the case. I cannot even understand someone who disagrees with such a basic conception of the facts. He must be a simpleton!

Philosophy can help us become more adept at "breaking the spell" of these underlying conceptual structures, or at the very least can help us to bring them into the light.

Reclaiming Creation

Read this journal article today:

Hanby, Michael, Reclaiming Creation, Theology Today 62(2006): 476-83.

Michael Hanby is Assistant Professor of Theology at Baylor University.

From the concluding paragraphs of the article:

"The first function of the Christian doctrine of creation, then, is simply to protect the infinite qualitative difference between God and all that is not God, something that both Darwinian and creationist "explanations" fail to do. Creation thus understood is not an alternative theory or explanation of the world of the sort Darwinians or other scientists demand, but rather a denial in principle that any such "theory of everything" is finally possible, and a suspicion that any such comprehensive theory will necessarily exercise a reductive tyranny over the things it purports to "explain." To precisely this extent, the Christian doctrine of creation is more "agnostic," less ideological, and thus - dare we say? - more scientific than Darwinism. The Christian doctrine of creation refuses to posit a causal mechanism for the being of the world, but only a misunderstanding of the word "God" could register this refusal as a failure. For God is no "sky hook," a straw man of Darwinism's own invention that liken's God's creative act to a piece of stage-machinery that "intervenes" from "beyond," like Aphrodite restoring Paris to his bedchamber. Rather, God is that simple, immutable act of being and love so transcendently other to creation as to be at once external and internal to it, mysteriously indwelling it while calling it into the novelty of existence in the mystery of divine love." (P. 482)

Hanby encourages a fresh approach to the debate between faith and science with respect to the question of origins. Natural selection in particular, and science in general, at best, can only be an explanation of "what is." It can never comment on how things came to because there can be no naturalistic explanation of how something arises out of nothing. There are limits to "explanation," whether naturalistic or theological. There are things that neither science nor theology can deliver. The Christian doctrine of creation serves to highlight the incredible distinction between God and the "novelty of existence." We are here, not because God needs us to be. We are here because of God's unexplainable act of love in creation. For this reason Hanby thinks that Darwinism, creationism, and Intelligent Design, are missing the point when it comes to origins.

Dreams of a better world

Reading with transforming effects

From Anthony Thiselton: "New Horizons in Hermeutics"

"Texts, first, we argue, open new horizons for readers. Because of their capacity to bring about change, texts and especially biblical texts engage with readers in ways which can productively transform horizons, attitudes, criteria of relevance, or even communities and inter-personal situations. In this sense we may speak of transforming biblical reading. The very process of reading may lead to a re-ranking of expectations, assumptions, and goals which readers initially bring to texts.

Gadamer points out, however, that such a process does not occur inevitably or automatically. Only if we respect the distinctiveness of the horizons of the text as against the distinctiveness of our 0wn reader-horizon can a creative and productive interaction of horizons occur. The distance between the reader and the text performs a positive hermeneutical function. Premature assimilation into the perspectives projected by the horizons of readers leaves the reader trapped within his or her own prior horizons. Worse, in such a case the reader may stand under the illusion that the texts have fully addressed him or her. Still more significanctly, interaction between the two horizons of text and readers will, if premature assimilation has taken place, appear uneventful, bland, routine, and entirely unremarkable.

Within the Christian community the reading of biblical texts often takes this uneventful and bland form. For the nature of the reading-process is governed by the horizons of expectation already pre-formed by the community of readers or by the individual. Preachers often draw from texts what they had already decided to say; congregations sometimes look to biblical readings only to affirm the community-identity and life-style which they already enjoy. The biblical writings, in such a situation become assimilated into the function of creeds: they become primarily institutional mechanisms to ensure continuity of corporate belief and identity.

This is not to deny that prior understanding of biblical texts can become corporately embodied in the tradition which shapes our horizons....Nevertheless interpretations of texts and of earlier traditions can also become institutionalized and fossilized into forms which defeat the original vision which they emerged to serve. Traditions can absorb error, and be overtaken by new understandings and contexts." (Taken from the Introduction P.8-9)

I love this insight into how reading the Bible can simply be a bland reaffirmation of everything we believe before we start to read or a creative confrontation with our own pre-understanding. I am fascinated by the very real danger of our seducing the text of the Bible into speaking our own truth back to us. Perhaps one of the most important signals that this is what is happening is when our reading becomes "uneventful, bland, routine, and entirely unremarkable." What a delicate balancing act it is to listen with benefit to the voice of the living God.