If God is eternal it is logically necessary that the creation is eternal:
1. God is eternal
2. God's thoughts are eternal
a) Nothing can be added to or taken away from God or his perfection is impugned
b) All the thoughts God has he always had
3. God's thoughts are perfect
a) God's thoughts are synthetic (rather than analytic)
i) God grasps every thing immediately in all of its relationship to all other things
ii) God does not learn, develop ideas, research, investigate, experiment
b) God's thoughts are not wasted, or wishful, or empty
4. Since 1), 2), and 3), what God thinks, is
5. God thought the creation
6. The creation was not brought into being at any point in time. Time and space are a feature of the creation and do not exist apart from it
7. Therefore the creation is eternal
Wednesday, December 28, 2005
Sunday, December 25, 2005
Saturday, December 24, 2005
Methods of inquiry
In Anthony Thiselton's (The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description) discussion of Heidegger he has some comments to make about the relationship between Heidegger's thought and that of T.F. Torrance with respect to scientific method and the epistemological task. Thiselton writes:
"True 'objectivity,' if this is the right word at all, depends on the appropriateness of the method of inquiry to the obect of inquiry. We do not prescribe the same methods in advance of all inquiries, on the assumption that one particular model of the act of knowledge is the only 'objective' one." (P. 188)
If we attempt to universalize the scientific method as the only appropriate method of inquiry for all objects of inquiry then many possible worlds of knowledge are eliminated as legitimate objects by definition. If the scientific method is the only method of inquiry we have then we have put strict limits on what we can even raise questions about. This is the "if my only tool is a hammer, then every problem is a nail" approach to simplifying the epistemological task.
Andrew Rowell, in his blog, ID in the United Kingdom, comments about the lack of awareness amongst many scientists of the role that a worldview plays in how we think and defend our positions. In his post, "The Darwinist Propaganda Carnival continues...," he writes:
"Thus scientists have crossed over the line between the pursuit of truth to the defence of a worldview (italics and bold type mine). The odd thing is that they do not seem to realise what they are doing. Most of them simply have no concept that there is such a thing as a “worldview” they are so immersed in their own view of the world that they don’t really believe that there can be anything else other than naturalism without it deserving to be in a padded clinic.
Scientists (especially biologists trained to think in exclusively evolutionist fashion) are poorly placed to draw the distinctions between belief based upon evidence and belief based upon worldview.
Evolution provides poor resources for explaining the huge problems of the origins of life and the origins of huge amounts of complex machinery which makes our best efforts at technology look very clumsy indeed. To pretend that we have demonstrated that unintelligent causes provide a full explanation for all this is dishonest."
When our object of inquiry shifts, our method of inquiry may have to shift as well. This goes some way towards explaining how people who are brilliant in their field may begin to talk nonsense when they cross over to another field of knowledge that is inappropiate to their familiar methods.
"True 'objectivity,' if this is the right word at all, depends on the appropriateness of the method of inquiry to the obect of inquiry. We do not prescribe the same methods in advance of all inquiries, on the assumption that one particular model of the act of knowledge is the only 'objective' one." (P. 188)
If we attempt to universalize the scientific method as the only appropriate method of inquiry for all objects of inquiry then many possible worlds of knowledge are eliminated as legitimate objects by definition. If the scientific method is the only method of inquiry we have then we have put strict limits on what we can even raise questions about. This is the "if my only tool is a hammer, then every problem is a nail" approach to simplifying the epistemological task.
Andrew Rowell, in his blog, ID in the United Kingdom, comments about the lack of awareness amongst many scientists of the role that a worldview plays in how we think and defend our positions. In his post, "The Darwinist Propaganda Carnival continues...," he writes:
"Thus scientists have crossed over the line between the pursuit of truth to the defence of a worldview (italics and bold type mine). The odd thing is that they do not seem to realise what they are doing. Most of them simply have no concept that there is such a thing as a “worldview” they are so immersed in their own view of the world that they don’t really believe that there can be anything else other than naturalism without it deserving to be in a padded clinic.
Scientists (especially biologists trained to think in exclusively evolutionist fashion) are poorly placed to draw the distinctions between belief based upon evidence and belief based upon worldview.
Evolution provides poor resources for explaining the huge problems of the origins of life and the origins of huge amounts of complex machinery which makes our best efforts at technology look very clumsy indeed. To pretend that we have demonstrated that unintelligent causes provide a full explanation for all this is dishonest."
When our object of inquiry shifts, our method of inquiry may have to shift as well. This goes some way towards explaining how people who are brilliant in their field may begin to talk nonsense when they cross over to another field of knowledge that is inappropiate to their familiar methods.
Tuesday, December 20, 2005
Pre-understanding
Pre-understanding is a technical term used in theology and philosophy of language to refer to what we unreflectively bring with us to the reading of a text. I am particularly interested in the role pre-understanding has to play in the interpretation of the Bible. The subject is both fascinating and important because it raises questions about our ability to understand the Bible (or any text). Thinking about this also helps towards an understanding of why we often find ourselves in conflict with one another about what the Bible says. We are surprised that what is clear to us is not clear to someone else. We want to know why we can't just read the Bible and let it say to us whatever it has to say and be done with it. One of the reasons is the problem of pre-understanding. We don't come to the Bible with a blank mind, waiting for the Bible to write across our consciousness whatever it pleases. We come to the Bible out of a particular culture, with a certain world view, with a set of things that we think we already know and understand, with certain bottom lines about what is reasonable and what is not, and so on. These things, that we come to the Bible with, affect the way we hear the Bible, aid in our interpretation, and direct the way we read the text and draw concepts and conclusions from it. This is unavoidable, the goal is not to come to the text with a blank mind but to make the effort to understand the mind that we are bringing to the text. There is no escaping the problems that are raised by this. It is logically impossible to come to the text with no understanding. I come with my pre-understanding and if I make an effort to be aware of what I am bringing to the text I may be prepared to make some changes in my world view where the text may seem to demand it. If this happens I can then have a refined pre-understanding which I will in turn bring back to the text the next time I read it. My world-view tells me how to interpret the text. I may wish to return to my naive position where I believed that the Bible was speaking to me and I was passively listening. Once I have begun to reflect on the problem of pre-understanding I can no longer be this naive. I am not a passive listener. I am shaping the meaning of the text as fast as the words are coming off the page and entering my mind.
As a simple starting place for reflecting on this consider the hermeneutical circle. The hermeutical circle says that I read a particular text and it helps me develop my global understanding of what the whole book is about. In Biblical terms we are talking about the relationship between exegesis and theology. I study a small passage of Scripture, seek to understand what it is saying and attempt to find a place for that in the development of my theology as a whole. The circle part comes in because, all the while, my theology is informing my interpretation of the particular passage that I am seeking to exegete. I don't reject my entire theological system in order to freshly interpret, without any pre-understanding, the text at hand. On the other hand, I don't want my theological system to be immune from challenge by a particular text. This presents a problem in reading that Bible that is best addressed by being aware of the problem. Creating a theology is a way of organizing everything I am learning from my regular reading of the text. This organizing begins to create a conceptual system that can become so complete and compelling that particular texts can no longer successfully challenge the sytem, they must be assimilated into it. My theological system becomes a pre-understanding that forces itself upon my reading of Scripture. Someone with a different theological pre-understanding becomes a conundrum to me when I see how he is reading a passage of Scripture that "obviously" means something quite different than he thinks it does.
The problem of pre-understanding is much bigger than this limited description of the hermeneutical circle. It takes in everything I think and believe about the world, in particular everything I unreflectively think and believe, everything that seems self-evident and obvious to me. Whatever I was when I came into the world I am definitely no tabula rasa by the time I begin to read the Bible. This is important because, if the Bible is the Word of God, it is most important that it be able to speak to me and to my world. If I am distorting its message every time I read it I had better at least be aware of it.
I believe that Herman Dooyeweerd has at least pointed the way to a corrective in his concept of a transcendental critique of culture.
As a simple starting place for reflecting on this consider the hermeneutical circle. The hermeutical circle says that I read a particular text and it helps me develop my global understanding of what the whole book is about. In Biblical terms we are talking about the relationship between exegesis and theology. I study a small passage of Scripture, seek to understand what it is saying and attempt to find a place for that in the development of my theology as a whole. The circle part comes in because, all the while, my theology is informing my interpretation of the particular passage that I am seeking to exegete. I don't reject my entire theological system in order to freshly interpret, without any pre-understanding, the text at hand. On the other hand, I don't want my theological system to be immune from challenge by a particular text. This presents a problem in reading that Bible that is best addressed by being aware of the problem. Creating a theology is a way of organizing everything I am learning from my regular reading of the text. This organizing begins to create a conceptual system that can become so complete and compelling that particular texts can no longer successfully challenge the sytem, they must be assimilated into it. My theological system becomes a pre-understanding that forces itself upon my reading of Scripture. Someone with a different theological pre-understanding becomes a conundrum to me when I see how he is reading a passage of Scripture that "obviously" means something quite different than he thinks it does.
The problem of pre-understanding is much bigger than this limited description of the hermeneutical circle. It takes in everything I think and believe about the world, in particular everything I unreflectively think and believe, everything that seems self-evident and obvious to me. Whatever I was when I came into the world I am definitely no tabula rasa by the time I begin to read the Bible. This is important because, if the Bible is the Word of God, it is most important that it be able to speak to me and to my world. If I am distorting its message every time I read it I had better at least be aware of it.
I believe that Herman Dooyeweerd has at least pointed the way to a corrective in his concept of a transcendental critique of culture.
Thursday, December 15, 2005
When two positions conflict
I follow a number of ongoing debates in theology, philosophy, and science. Many of these debates have raged for centuries and yet there are still two or more competing positions. Listening to some of the dialogue in the debates is discouraging at times, laughable at other times. Just some thoughts on what makes some positions intractable and some debates unfruitful:
1. All theories are underdetermined by the facts/evidence that support them (Quine). (see previous post)
2. Large systems that are internally consistent are naturally resistant to change. From the inside, everything makes perfect sense.
3. The higher the commitment to being right the more pressure there is to compromise the truth.
4. The more we have invested in a particular position, the more reluctant we are to abandon it, even in the face of increasing evidence against it.
5. Rhetorical tools can be used to make our argument appear stronger than it is and to make our opponents appear weaker than it is.
6. Isolation and insulation create a fortress mentality that results in an entire industry of defense. This undermines attention to being self-critical. In the pursuit of truth self-criticism is far more important than criticism of the dissenters.
7. Living in the fortress (box) makes it difficult to think outside the fortress (box). The more time I spend inside my "system" the less I can visualize any reasonable life outside of it.
8. Failure to appreciate how powerfully our presuppositions determine what we will admit as fact, how much weight we will give the facts we accept, and where the facts will be placed in our overall conceptualizing.
9. Laziness: Unwillingness to be rigorous in the development of our system and to be able to admit what is deduction and what is induction.
10. Frustration: We grow tired of the endless debate. We weary of the back and forth of argument and counterargument. We then either give up the dialogue or take shortcuts that undermine a fruitful process.
11. There are matters of community respect, financial reward, associations, and other disincentives that make it difficult for me to fully surrender to the pursuit of truth even if it means yielding some of my cherished beliefs.
12. Pride: I think that it is a shame to me to have held a position that I must now reject or radically alter, particularly if I have argued loudly against it in the past.
13. Semantics: The same or similar terms are being used in different ways and with different meanings in competing systems. This creates confusion and misunderstanding.
14. Lack of respect: Failure to value the opponent and to take him seriously as a human being.
15. Fear: I will defend irrationally whatever I am afraid of losing. This is particularly ture if I am unwilling to admit to myself what my non-negotiables are and why they are non-negotiable.
1. All theories are underdetermined by the facts/evidence that support them (Quine). (see previous post)
2. Large systems that are internally consistent are naturally resistant to change. From the inside, everything makes perfect sense.
3. The higher the commitment to being right the more pressure there is to compromise the truth.
4. The more we have invested in a particular position, the more reluctant we are to abandon it, even in the face of increasing evidence against it.
5. Rhetorical tools can be used to make our argument appear stronger than it is and to make our opponents appear weaker than it is.
6. Isolation and insulation create a fortress mentality that results in an entire industry of defense. This undermines attention to being self-critical. In the pursuit of truth self-criticism is far more important than criticism of the dissenters.
7. Living in the fortress (box) makes it difficult to think outside the fortress (box). The more time I spend inside my "system" the less I can visualize any reasonable life outside of it.
8. Failure to appreciate how powerfully our presuppositions determine what we will admit as fact, how much weight we will give the facts we accept, and where the facts will be placed in our overall conceptualizing.
9. Laziness: Unwillingness to be rigorous in the development of our system and to be able to admit what is deduction and what is induction.
10. Frustration: We grow tired of the endless debate. We weary of the back and forth of argument and counterargument. We then either give up the dialogue or take shortcuts that undermine a fruitful process.
11. There are matters of community respect, financial reward, associations, and other disincentives that make it difficult for me to fully surrender to the pursuit of truth even if it means yielding some of my cherished beliefs.
12. Pride: I think that it is a shame to me to have held a position that I must now reject or radically alter, particularly if I have argued loudly against it in the past.
13. Semantics: The same or similar terms are being used in different ways and with different meanings in competing systems. This creates confusion and misunderstanding.
14. Lack of respect: Failure to value the opponent and to take him seriously as a human being.
15. Fear: I will defend irrationally whatever I am afraid of losing. This is particularly ture if I am unwilling to admit to myself what my non-negotiables are and why they are non-negotiable.
Sunday, December 11, 2005
Willard Quine
Willard Quine (1908-2000) was a mathematician and philosopher of science at Harvard University for 44 years. I have found Quine to be very helpful in trying to understand why there are so many unsolved debates in every field of thinking and research. Quine stated that every theory is underdetermined by the facts or evidence that supports it. Every theorist takes the available evidence and organizes it into a coherent and internally consistent monolith. It is easy to understand why there might be two or more theories that are contradictory but that are both internally consistent and that both utilize the same set of facts. No system can incorporate all of the facts when constructing its theory. One system will place more weight on some evidence and less on other evidence. One system will ignore certain facts while another system incorporates them.
I find this helpful in explaining the persistent theological (Calvinism vs. Arminianism etc.), philosophical (freedom vs. determinism etc.), political (one form of government vs. another etc.), and scientific (Intelligent Design vs. naturalistic evolution etc.) debates.
What I wonder is whether it is better to hold some contradictory beliefs both of which seem to describe important truths than to resolve the contradictions in favor of an internally consistent theory. Resolving the conflict in this way can end a fruitful debate and make the important issues that they represent disappear. Loyalty to a theory through this kind of resolution might actually have the effect of barricading us against the truth. There is a tremendous pull towards keeping everything consistent and towards averting as quickly as possible any contradictions that might create confusion. I believe it was Emerson who said that "consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds." The resolution of important issues into neatly defined camps can have the effect of polarizing, even ghetoizing, the debate. The important thing then becomes defending the camp, rather than pursuing the truth. This has led many debates into endless talking past each other, ad hominem argumentation, and fruitless rhetorical tricks.
I find this helpful in explaining the persistent theological (Calvinism vs. Arminianism etc.), philosophical (freedom vs. determinism etc.), political (one form of government vs. another etc.), and scientific (Intelligent Design vs. naturalistic evolution etc.) debates.
What I wonder is whether it is better to hold some contradictory beliefs both of which seem to describe important truths than to resolve the contradictions in favor of an internally consistent theory. Resolving the conflict in this way can end a fruitful debate and make the important issues that they represent disappear. Loyalty to a theory through this kind of resolution might actually have the effect of barricading us against the truth. There is a tremendous pull towards keeping everything consistent and towards averting as quickly as possible any contradictions that might create confusion. I believe it was Emerson who said that "consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds." The resolution of important issues into neatly defined camps can have the effect of polarizing, even ghetoizing, the debate. The important thing then becomes defending the camp, rather than pursuing the truth. This has led many debates into endless talking past each other, ad hominem argumentation, and fruitless rhetorical tricks.
Wednesday, December 07, 2005
Rhetorical tools
I was not able to find much by way of a science of evolution in Dawkin's two books, "The Blind Watchmaker" and "Climbing Mount Improbable." What I did find was a whole array of thought experiments each supporting other thought experiments. Certain rhetorical tools were employed to make these thought experiments more palatable. The two primary tools were these:
1. Imagine ever smaller increments of change.
2. Imagine ever larger amounts of time.
These two tools when applied rigorously and frequently have the effect of making the whole process appear natural, simple, and eminently reasonable. Since Dawkins has not engaged in anything that has required the use of the scientific method these tools only need to be applied to imaginative ideas.
If we are having trouble conceiving of any particular change we are told simply to imagine a smaller change, and if this is too difficult then to imagine an even smaller change. Eventually we will arrive at a change that is small enough that no one could reasonably object to it. Two immediate problems arise with this:
1. What if the change I imagine is so small as to make no difference to the survivability of the organism? Then no affirmative selection is likely to occur and our thought experiment fails. Dawkins wants us to imagine a change small enough that we can be comfortable with but requires that that imaginative change is large enough to prove his point.
2. What if the problem is not with small increments but with the mechanism of change itself? I might decide that I can jump across the Grand Canyon. Perhaps you have trouble believing my claim. But what if I tell you that I will train and aim to jump one inch more each week than the week before and in this way eventually leap the grand canyon. Perhaps if you have some experience with athletics you will think that increasing by an inch a week is to ambitious a goal to be reasonable. Well than imagine that I jump a half inch, a quarter of an inch, or one micrometer more each week. The flaw in this is that there may be certain limiting factors that cannot be transcended in reality by this thought experiment, even though it might seem reasonable to the mind. In the case of evolution it may well be that the problem of irreducible complexity is such a limiting factor. Some gaps can simply never be jumped no matter how many little steps we try to take toward overcoming the limitations or how long we have to try. Dawkins would like to use his rhetorical tools to steer us away from such objections.
The second tool, that of ever larger amounts of time, fails for the same reason. If something is not possible in principle then it is not possible in the moment or in eternity. I cannot conceive of the law of non-contradiction failing just because I imagine ever larger amounts of time in which it might have an opportunity to fail. What must be shown is that the mechanism of change is sound.
What has really happened with the use of these rhetorical tools is that we have moved away from Paley's watch to the watch of the hypnotist. The tools have a hypnotic effect but the use of them is fundamentally flawed because they beg the question of the soundness of the mechanism. We are frequently subjected to rhetorical enchantments. At times you can almost hear the hpnotist say: "Look at my watch, you're getting sleepy, you're getting very sleepy..." At times you can almost hear the organ music in the background.
1. Imagine ever smaller increments of change.
2. Imagine ever larger amounts of time.
These two tools when applied rigorously and frequently have the effect of making the whole process appear natural, simple, and eminently reasonable. Since Dawkins has not engaged in anything that has required the use of the scientific method these tools only need to be applied to imaginative ideas.
If we are having trouble conceiving of any particular change we are told simply to imagine a smaller change, and if this is too difficult then to imagine an even smaller change. Eventually we will arrive at a change that is small enough that no one could reasonably object to it. Two immediate problems arise with this:
1. What if the change I imagine is so small as to make no difference to the survivability of the organism? Then no affirmative selection is likely to occur and our thought experiment fails. Dawkins wants us to imagine a change small enough that we can be comfortable with but requires that that imaginative change is large enough to prove his point.
2. What if the problem is not with small increments but with the mechanism of change itself? I might decide that I can jump across the Grand Canyon. Perhaps you have trouble believing my claim. But what if I tell you that I will train and aim to jump one inch more each week than the week before and in this way eventually leap the grand canyon. Perhaps if you have some experience with athletics you will think that increasing by an inch a week is to ambitious a goal to be reasonable. Well than imagine that I jump a half inch, a quarter of an inch, or one micrometer more each week. The flaw in this is that there may be certain limiting factors that cannot be transcended in reality by this thought experiment, even though it might seem reasonable to the mind. In the case of evolution it may well be that the problem of irreducible complexity is such a limiting factor. Some gaps can simply never be jumped no matter how many little steps we try to take toward overcoming the limitations or how long we have to try. Dawkins would like to use his rhetorical tools to steer us away from such objections.
The second tool, that of ever larger amounts of time, fails for the same reason. If something is not possible in principle then it is not possible in the moment or in eternity. I cannot conceive of the law of non-contradiction failing just because I imagine ever larger amounts of time in which it might have an opportunity to fail. What must be shown is that the mechanism of change is sound.
What has really happened with the use of these rhetorical tools is that we have moved away from Paley's watch to the watch of the hypnotist. The tools have a hypnotic effect but the use of them is fundamentally flawed because they beg the question of the soundness of the mechanism. We are frequently subjected to rhetorical enchantments. At times you can almost hear the hpnotist say: "Look at my watch, you're getting sleepy, you're getting very sleepy..." At times you can almost hear the organ music in the background.
Tuesday, December 06, 2005
A mystery solved
The opening strain of the Dawkins symphony to evolution, in "The Blind Watchmaker," begins with this statement:
"This book is written in the conviction that our own existence once presented the greatest of all mysteries, but that it is a mystery no longer because it is solved." P. ix
Two important claims are presented here:
1. The mystery of our existence has been solved by the theory of evolution.
2. Before Darwin there was no solution (or no credible solution) to this problem.
With regard to the first claim we might begin by noting its comprehensive sweep. Evolution does not simply explain how life developed from simple progenitors to complex life forms. Evolution explains the whole mystery of our existence. The "fact" of evolution establishes the philosophy of philosophical naturalism. I think that what Dawkins is saying is that with respect to the physical origin and history of life on earth a clear understanding of evolution makes God unnecessary. However, the question of the necessity of God for our existence is not aided or hindered by any understanding of nature or its mechanisms. As useful as the scientific method has been to the realm of science it is beyond itself with respect to metaphysical questions (such as "the mystery of our existence") in particular and philosophical questions in general. Darwinism has done nothing to make atheism more "intellectually fulfilling." Scientific fact is fodder for both the theist and the atheist, accessible to both and amenable to both. The mystery of our existence will never be solved by pointing to some scientific fact.
With regard to the second claim, that Darwin has solved "the greatest of all mysteries", this is just a little bit of grandstanding on the part of Dawkins. This would be analogous to Kraft inventing a new food spread and saying: "we finally solved the mystery of what to spread on toast." This line of reasoning attempts to make peanut butter, Cheez Whiz, jam, etc. merely provisional solutions awaiting the latest, final, and definitive solution to the problem of food spreads. The fact is that philosophical naturalism (we can't simply say Darwinism because it is not necessarily incompatible with previous solutions to the mystery of our existence) is just another, alternative, explanation for this "mystery." Dawkins seeks to prove too much. It is interesting that scientists sometimes complain about religion making pronouncements on science but these same scientists don't mind making pronouncements on religion and philosophy. The sword of Damacles cuts both ways.
"This book is written in the conviction that our own existence once presented the greatest of all mysteries, but that it is a mystery no longer because it is solved." P. ix
Two important claims are presented here:
1. The mystery of our existence has been solved by the theory of evolution.
2. Before Darwin there was no solution (or no credible solution) to this problem.
With regard to the first claim we might begin by noting its comprehensive sweep. Evolution does not simply explain how life developed from simple progenitors to complex life forms. Evolution explains the whole mystery of our existence. The "fact" of evolution establishes the philosophy of philosophical naturalism. I think that what Dawkins is saying is that with respect to the physical origin and history of life on earth a clear understanding of evolution makes God unnecessary. However, the question of the necessity of God for our existence is not aided or hindered by any understanding of nature or its mechanisms. As useful as the scientific method has been to the realm of science it is beyond itself with respect to metaphysical questions (such as "the mystery of our existence") in particular and philosophical questions in general. Darwinism has done nothing to make atheism more "intellectually fulfilling." Scientific fact is fodder for both the theist and the atheist, accessible to both and amenable to both. The mystery of our existence will never be solved by pointing to some scientific fact.
With regard to the second claim, that Darwin has solved "the greatest of all mysteries", this is just a little bit of grandstanding on the part of Dawkins. This would be analogous to Kraft inventing a new food spread and saying: "we finally solved the mystery of what to spread on toast." This line of reasoning attempts to make peanut butter, Cheez Whiz, jam, etc. merely provisional solutions awaiting the latest, final, and definitive solution to the problem of food spreads. The fact is that philosophical naturalism (we can't simply say Darwinism because it is not necessarily incompatible with previous solutions to the mystery of our existence) is just another, alternative, explanation for this "mystery." Dawkins seeks to prove too much. It is interesting that scientists sometimes complain about religion making pronouncements on science but these same scientists don't mind making pronouncements on religion and philosophy. The sword of Damacles cuts both ways.
Monday, December 05, 2005
Why the world appears to be designed
In the book, "The Blind Watchmaker," Dawkins ponders why it took so long for the idea of evolution to arise, why so many brilliant scientists and thinkers in various disciplines missed it, and why so many people today will not accept it. Dawkins makes the following statement: "It is almost as if the human brain were specifically designed to misunderstand Darwinism, and to find it hard to believe." P. xi
Dawkins, of course, was not the first to make this observation:
"The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessess and wickedness of men who suppress the truth by their wickedness, since what may be know about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities - his eternal power and divine nature - has been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse. For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened."
Romans 1:18-21
Where Dawkins tries to explain why people reject a naturalistic explanation for the world, the apostle Paul explains why people reject a theistic explanation.
Dawkins, of course, was not the first to make this observation:
"The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessess and wickedness of men who suppress the truth by their wickedness, since what may be know about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities - his eternal power and divine nature - has been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse. For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened."
Romans 1:18-21
Where Dawkins tries to explain why people reject a naturalistic explanation for the world, the apostle Paul explains why people reject a theistic explanation.
Sunday, December 04, 2005
How to dismiss an opponent
In "The Blind Watchmaker" Richard Dawkins makes the following two statements:
1. "No serious biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened..." P. 287
Now complete the syllogism:
X biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened
Therefore X biologist is not a serious biologist
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X biologist's arguments because he really isn't a serious biologist. He is dismissed.
2. "Modern theologians of any sophistication have given up believing in instantaneous creation." P. 316
Now complete the syllogism:
X theologian believes in instantaneous creation
Therefore X theologian is not a sophisticated theologian
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X theologians arguments because he really isn't a sophisticated theologian. He is dismissed.
Presumably the argument would continue:
3. No serious physicist ...
4. No serious chemist ...
5. No sophisticated philosopher ...
6. No serious geologist ...
7. No self-respecting dentist ...
What is wrong with this line of reasoning?:
False premise.
It is not possible to evaluate the seriousness or sophistication of someone's thinking based on one simple litmus test. The universe in which we live is just a little bit more complicated than that.
1. "No serious biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened..." P. 287
Now complete the syllogism:
X biologist doubts the fact that evolution has happened
Therefore X biologist is not a serious biologist
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X biologist's arguments because he really isn't a serious biologist. He is dismissed.
2. "Modern theologians of any sophistication have given up believing in instantaneous creation." P. 316
Now complete the syllogism:
X theologian believes in instantaneous creation
Therefore X theologian is not a sophisticated theologian
Result: I don't have to give any weight to X theologians arguments because he really isn't a sophisticated theologian. He is dismissed.
Presumably the argument would continue:
3. No serious physicist ...
4. No serious chemist ...
5. No sophisticated philosopher ...
6. No serious geologist ...
7. No self-respecting dentist ...
What is wrong with this line of reasoning?:
False premise.
It is not possible to evaluate the seriousness or sophistication of someone's thinking based on one simple litmus test. The universe in which we live is just a little bit more complicated than that.
Saturday, December 03, 2005
An exercise in the literature of evolution
I have recently read two books by Richard Dawkins: "The Blind Watchmaker" and "Climbing Mount Improbable." Here is an exercise that you can try at home. Read through these two books with pen and two pieces of paper. On one piece of paper write down every piece of clear evidence that Dawkins offers in support of evolution. On the other sheet of paper write down every place where Dawkins asks you to engage in a thought experiment to imagine how evolution might have ocurred. When you are finished ask yourself whether, based on these two books alone, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the theory of evolution is anything more than the ultimate thought experiment.
Friday, December 02, 2005
Looking for a Foundation
If our only tool is reason then the only house we can build is scepticism. If we want to build some other house we need some other tool(s) in addition to reason (or perhaps a redefinition of reason). We need a way to establish a foundation for all of our belief. How can any belief be properly basic, i.e. noninferentially grounded, on the basis of reason alone? Even those things that are normally accepted as properly basic by Foundationalists can be questioned. For instance, why should I consider a particular belief to be properly basic just because it is incorrigible? I believe that Descartes was correct in understanding that only God can guarantee the integrity of thought.
But is belief in God properly basic? This is what Reformed Epistemology in general, and the work of Alston and Plantinga in particular, hopes to establish. However, have they accomplished their task and is the argument convincing? There is some concern that they have proven too much, if the proof stands at all. If the proof is just as effective for any belief in any deity or imagined deity then does the proof have any value at all?
Reformed theology roots belief in the God of the Bible (as opposed to theism in general) in Revelation. The God who created all things has revealed himself in the creation in general and in the Bible in particular. Our belief in the God of the Bible has ontological roots. This ontology is supported moment by moment by the (doctrines of the) infallibility and perspicuity of the Scriptures and by the internal testimony of the Spirit of God. This is why Paul, in Romans one, rejects any possible claim to atheism, agnosticism, or alternate theism, as a mere suppression of the truth (of revelation). Yet, how do we defend this claim against similar counter claims from other religions? How does this not reduce our testimony to a "he said, she said" debate?
Help is on the way: I have requested Plantinga's "God and Other Minds" and Alston's "Perceiving God" for Christmas. Any suggestions on directions I might take in my reading or thinking would be appreciated.
But is belief in God properly basic? This is what Reformed Epistemology in general, and the work of Alston and Plantinga in particular, hopes to establish. However, have they accomplished their task and is the argument convincing? There is some concern that they have proven too much, if the proof stands at all. If the proof is just as effective for any belief in any deity or imagined deity then does the proof have any value at all?
Reformed theology roots belief in the God of the Bible (as opposed to theism in general) in Revelation. The God who created all things has revealed himself in the creation in general and in the Bible in particular. Our belief in the God of the Bible has ontological roots. This ontology is supported moment by moment by the (doctrines of the) infallibility and perspicuity of the Scriptures and by the internal testimony of the Spirit of God. This is why Paul, in Romans one, rejects any possible claim to atheism, agnosticism, or alternate theism, as a mere suppression of the truth (of revelation). Yet, how do we defend this claim against similar counter claims from other religions? How does this not reduce our testimony to a "he said, she said" debate?
Help is on the way: I have requested Plantinga's "God and Other Minds" and Alston's "Perceiving God" for Christmas. Any suggestions on directions I might take in my reading or thinking would be appreciated.
Thursday, December 01, 2005
Invisible Cats
"If there were an invisible cat in that chair, the chair would look empty; but the chair does look empty; therefore there is an invisible cat in it." (C.S. Lewis, "The Four Loves")
Can a belief in invisible cats be logically disproved?
What would such a proof require?
Can a belief in invisible cats be logically disproved?
What would such a proof require?
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